בס”ד

Taromet – תרעומת

There was not yet any development of a specific moral order as distinct from the legal system in the talmudic period. However, it is already clearly recognized in tannaitic literature that legal sanctions could not enforce every form of behavior which was morally desirable. Indeed the Mishnah and Tosefta make occasional references to situations where, despite justification, one party lacks any legal recourse against the other and “… he has nothing but resentment [taromet] against him” (e.g., bm 4:6, 6:1; Tosef., Git. 3:1; bm 4:22).
– Encyclopaedia Judaica¹

The concept of taromet generally² refers to a complaint about someone that caused inconvenience, or that unnecessarily prevents others from gain. Additionally, it can apply to damages caused in such a manner that does not constitute a financial or legally acceptable claim.

In the Talmud, we often find the expression that “he has nothing but resentment [taromet] against him,”³ meaning they are not legally owed anything but are only entitled to complain.⁴

In the Talmud:

The Mishna (Mishnah Bava Metzia 6:1) states:

If one hired craftsmen and they deceived each other, they have no legally valid complaint against each other, but only cause for complaint.⁵

The Talmud⁶ analyzes the nature of deceit in the phrase “and they deceived each other.” The Talmud initially argues that this refers to a case where “the employer said to one of the laborers: Go and hire laborers for me, and that laborer went and deceived those other laborers.” Thus, the employer hired a contractor, and the deception happened between the contractor and the laborers.

For example, if the contractor offered the workers more than what the employer had initially offered, and the going rate is what the employer originally proposed, the workers do not have the right to demand the higher salary. Instead, they only have the right to complain. Although they are receiving the going rate, they still have grounds for complaint. They might argue that they could have found a job offering the higher rate, or that psychological factors,⁷ such as embarrassment, prevented them from accepting a job with a lower salary. Alternatively, they might claim that they performed higher-quality work that they would not have done for the lower pay, and there is no way to verify that claim.

Alternatively, if the contractor offered less than what the employer had originally offered, “although they agreed to those terms, they still have a grievance, as they can say to the one who came to terms with them: Don’t you have respect for the verse: “Do not withhold good from him to whom it is due, when it is in the power of your hand to do it” (Proverbs 3:27)”⁸

It is also possible that the deception occurs between the employer and the worker. For example, if one of them backs out of the agreement prior to the start of the work. Although there is no law against backing out of a verbal agreement, the other party is entitled to complain about the inconvenience it causes.⁹

A similar use of the term in the Mishna (Bava Metzia 4:6):

Until when may he [that is defrauded] return the coin? In large towns until he has had time to show it to a money-changer. In villages until the Sabbath eve. If he [that had given the coin] recognized it, even after twelve months he should accept it [in return], but [if he does not accept it the one who received it] only has a cause for complaint [against him].¹⁰

Similarly in the Talmud (Bava Metzia 77b):

And Rava says: With regard to one who lent one hundred dinars to another and the borrower paid it back one dinar at a time, this is a valid repayment. But the lender has grounds for a grievance against him for repaying him in this manner, as he can say to him: You have caused me to lose out, as it is easier to use a lump sum than a few coins at a time.¹¹

Similarly the Rambam writes (Mishneh Torah, Hiring 5:4):

When a person rents a ship and unloads in the midst of the journey, he must pay the fee for the entire journey. If, however, the renter finds another person who will rent the ship in his place until the location he originally agreed, he may rent it out to him. The owner of the ship has, however, a complaint against him.
Similarly, if the renter sold all the merchandise on the ship to another person in the middle of the way and descended, and the purchaser ascended in his place, the owner of the ship takes half the rent from the first one and half from the second. The owner has a complaint against the renter, because he required him to accommodate the opinion of another person with whom he is not familiar.¹² Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.¹³

Similarly (Mishneh Torah, Agents and Partners 1:5)

When a person gives money to his agent to purchase wheat or any other type of merchandise, and the agent does not make the purchase, the principal does not have a financial claim against the agent, only complaints.¹⁴

This complaint applies even if he had not specified a specific item he desired, but rather made a more general request, such as “buy me clothes” or “buy me fruit.”¹⁵

The Netivot HaMishpat (Beurim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 183:1) clarifies that if he is paying the agent to purchase the items, then he can indeed charge the agent for the loss he caused. However, if the agent was not paid to make the purchase, and the sender has no legal right to sue, he still retains the right to complain about the inconvenience caused.

There is also a very peculiar case of taromet regarding a non-invite to a friend’s wedding. The custom used to be that when someone got married, his friend would buy him a wedding gift, and then the friend would reciprocate with a similar gift for his wedding. It was an official gift exchange. If someone receives a gift from his friend but does not reciprocate with a gift for his friend’s wedding, he is required to return the gift he received. If he has a legitimate reason for missing his friend’s wedding (like being out of town), he may deduct the value of the food his friend ate at his wedding and only return the remainder. However, if he did not have a valid excuse, he is required to return the entire gift. If his friend did not invite him when he should have, he has the right to deduct the value and, additionally, gains the right to complain:

If Reuven was in the city when Shimon married, and he did not invite him or notify him, he may make such a deduction. Moreover, he has a justified complaint, for he should have notified him.¹⁶

In the above-mentioned examples, we find multiple reasons for complaints: because the other party backed out of an agreement, caused inconvenience (effort), created a change by necessitating dealings with a new person, or simply prevented someone from gaining an advantage.

These reasons have more details:

For backing out of an agreement:

Backing out of a verbal agreement, though not contractually binding, is still forbidden. The Talmud (Bava Metzia 49a) discusses “reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition… Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It constitutes an act of bad faith.”¹⁷ However, there are exceptions. For example, some opinions hold that if someone backs out of a deal for good reasons, he does not commit this transgression (for more on this topic, see mechuszár ámáná).

In the commentaries on Shulchan Aruch, there is a dispute about whether taromet (the right to complain) applies if the backtracking does not constitute an act of bad faith.¹⁸ Similarly, there is an opinion that taromet only applies if the workers back out of the deal, but not if the employer does.¹⁹ However, most rabbis believe it applies equally to both parties.²⁰

Among more modern rabbis, we find additional perspectives on this issue. For instance, one opinion holds that taromet only applies if walking back from the deal constitutes a financial loss,²¹ such as one party in a business agreement, reneges on the deal. However, if no financial loss is involved,²² there is no legitimate right to complain.

For the inconvenience/effort

An example for this is the scenario whereby one of the parties involved in an agreement removes himself from the deal creating a hassle to the second party, such as causing him a need to find a replacement. In this scenario, despite there being no actual financial loss and cause for complaint, he nonetheless has legitimate cause for grievance about the inconvenience. In some situations, finding a replacement is neither difficult nor significantly inconvenient. For example, if someone decides not to take a taxi at the airport, the driver can easily find a different passenger. In such cases, it can be argued that the inconvenience would not be sufficient cause for complaint.²³

For dealing with a new person

When withdrawing from a deal forces the other party to engage with a new person, even if the one backing out has found a replacement, there may not be grounds for financial loss or inconvenience complaints. However, having to interact with someone unfamiliar, while not a legal claim, constitutes a legitimate grievance.²⁴ Some argue that this complaint does not apply if it turns out the new person is also suitable to work with, while others maintain that even in such a scenario, there remains a right to complain.²⁵

On this point, there are discussions about which jobs or relationships give one the right to complain about having to deal with a new person (see later for more about this).

For preventing a gain

As mentioned above, if the employer offered a higher salary and the contractor lowered the rate when offering it, the workers have the right to complain for being prevented from this gain. The Talmud quotes the verse from Proverbs (3:27): “Do not withhold good from him to whom it is due.”²⁶ This principle appears in multiple places. For instance:

If one’s produce was completely harvested from the field, but he does not allow people to enter into his field to shorten their route, what do people say about him? They say: What benefit does so-and-so have by denying entry into his field? And what harm are people causing him by traversing his field? Concerning him, the verse says: Do not be called wicked by refraining from being good. The Gemara asks: Is it really written: Do not be called wicked by refraining from being good? There is no such verse in the Bible. The Gemara answers: Yes, an idea like this is found in the Bible, albeit in a slightly different form, as it is written like this: “Withhold not good from him to whom it is due, when it is in the power of your hand to do it” (Proverbs 3:27).²⁷
– (Bava Kamma 81b)

Here too, we see that “withholding” good from someone is subject to criticism and complaints. This concept also appears in the reasoning behind certain laws. For example, the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Schirut 5:5) writes:

Similarly, I conclude that if the owner of the home tells the renter: “Why should you trouble yourself to rent my house to others? If you do not desire to continue dwelling within it, leave and leave it alone; I am freeing you from the rent,” the renter may not sublet it to anyone else. For in such an instance, the charge: “Do not withhold good from its owner” applies. For instead of renting it out to someone else, the tenant should leave this person his own home.²⁸

Similarly, we find that when building a wall next to your neighbor’s one, the rabbis required maintaining a distance such that the public walking between the two walls would also strengthen the neighbor’s wall.²⁹ This requirement may also be based on this (“Do not withhold good from him to whom it is due”).³⁰

Preventing gain by failing to fulfill a task (competition)

Similarly, we find the idea of taromet regarding the prevention of gain whereby one party relied on a friend³¹ to perform a specific task, which the friend failed to carry out:

It was stated: “If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half [the gain]; if that one says, I did not buy [*After some time he returns the money and claims that he did not trade.], he only has a complaint on him.”³²
…Rebbi Isaac said, this implies³³ that if one who leaves another’s capital unemployed, he only has a complaint on him.
– Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:3

We also occasionally find that a messenger who fails to do what he agreed to, is not only subject to grievance but is also labeled as a swindler (ramai):³⁴

The mishna teaches that in the case of one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. A tanna taught concerning this issue: What he did is done; it is effective and the woman is betrothed to the second man, but he has treated him, i.e., the first man, in a deceitful manner, and it is prohibited to act in this fashion…
Rabba bar bar Ḥana gave money to Rav and said: Purchase this land for me. Rav went and purchased it for himself. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the baraita with regard to an agent who acts in this manner: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner?…³⁵
– Kiddushin 58b

When someone asks a friend to buy something, as mentioned above, even if a specific item is not specified, failing to make the purchase is still grounds for complaint. However, does this failure also mean that the friend is considered a swindler? This is a point of dispute between the Me’irat Einayim and the Turei Zahav.³⁶ If a specific item was specified and the friend still did not follow through, both agree that he is indeed a swindler.

However, there is an additional element to the story: the messenger married her himself. Does this matter? The Noda BiYhudah (II, Even HaEzer 72) claims that the deceitful behavior (and the reason to label him a swindler) lies not in the fact that he married her for himself, but rather in that he did not fulfill what the sender asked of him. There are, however, those who question this interpretation.³⁷ As mentioned above, when someone does not do what they agreed to, they are generally subject to a complaint but are not considered swindlers. This implies that the issue in this case is specifically that he took her for himself.

We find a similar issue in the Talmud (Kiddushin 59a):

Rav Giddel was engaging in the acquisition of a certain plot of land. In the meantime Rabbi Abba went and purchased it. Rav Giddel went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa. Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him: Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage Festival, when all come to hear the Festival sermon, on which occasion we can discuss this matter with him. When Rabbi Abba ascended Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa found him and said to him: If a pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf of bread that he found, and another came and took it from him, what is the halakha? Rabbi Abba said to him: The one who took it away is called wicked. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa replied: But if so, what is the reason that the Master acted this way? Rav Giddel was negotiating the purchase of this land and you purchased it. Rabbi Abba said to him: I did not know that Rav Giddel was trying to acquire the land.³⁸

In this case, we see that the person who prevented his friend from acquiring something he was in the process of buying is not only considered a swindler but is also called wicked (rasha). The gravity of being called wicked is far greater than that of being labeled a swindler.³⁹

In relation to this, we find an interesting question: what is the halacha regarding a man who marries a woman engaged to his friend? One might argue that he is “wicked,” in the same way that someone who buys something that another person was in the process of purchasing is. Rabbi Hagiz writes (Halakhot Ketanot 286) that while such a man is not considered wicked, he is subject to taromet (grievance). He also references the aforementioned Talmudic passage, noting that the man has acted in a deceitful manner, making him a swindler but not wicked.⁴⁰ However, Rabbi Hagiz does reference a differing opinion: the Maharami Mintz (Shut 98), who holds that this act is far worse than merely taking a loaf of bread before a pauper—it is akin to theft!

Additionally, Rabbi Maimon Birdugo, a Moroccan rabbi from the late 18th and early 19th centuries, states in his book Lev Mevin (Even HaEzer 12) that in this case, there aren’t even grounds for a complaint.⁴¹

On a similar note, some say⁴² that when one “takes the loaf of bread before the pauper” unintentionally (without knowing that the pauper wanted it), he is not even entitled to complain.⁴³

Acting to prevent gain

In the passage from the Jerusalem Talmud mentioned above, Rabbi Isaac understood that the reason for the complaint regarding a messenger failing to fulfill his agreement to buy something lies in the fact that the sender could have made a profit. By failing to act, the messenger prevented him from realizing that profit. This raises a broader discussion about the responsibility to avoid causing loss to others.

It is a complex topic, and there are cases and opinions where preventing someone from gaining is not just grounds for complaint but legally obligates compensation for the damage. For instance, Pnei Moshe explains the Talmudic passage mentioned above to mean that one is liable if they intentionally damage someone’s field to prevent it from yielding fruit and thereby causing a loss of profit. Discussions among rabbis vary regarding the exact circumstances under which one is only subject to complaint rather than legal liability. For further details on this, refer to this footnote⁴⁴.

The Rosh,⁴⁵ attributes this tarumot (where preventing gain has no liability for damages) to causing indirect harm. In such cases, although one ideally should not act in such a manner and should consider offering compensation,⁴⁶ there is no legal obligation to do so.

Similarly, the Radvaz, commenting on the Rambam’s ruling regarding a messenger who fails to purchase what was requested of him (that the affected person only has the right to complain), draws a parallel to the concept that one who prevents another from gaining (“one who leaves another’s capital unemployed”) may be “liable in the heavenly court but is exempt from human legal judgments.”⁴⁷

However, other rabbis reject this comparison arguing that preventing gain carries less liability than causing indirect damage.⁴⁸ Additionally, Tiferet Yisrael⁴⁹ asserts that one is not liable in the heavenly court for preventing gain.

Nevertheless, it seems unanimous that when someone prevents another from gaining in a manner not actionable in a human court of law, the affected party is entitled to complain.

The right not to be subject to grievance

When someone borrows money, their property becomes collateral for the loan. If they fail to repay, the lender can seize the property. If someone buys a house from a person who owes money, and the seller defaults on their debt, the lender can reclaim the property from the buyer. This is why it is important to agree on the terms of such a possibility when purchasing property. If the agreement is “beachrayut” (with responsibility), the seller must compensate the buyer if the house is seized by a lender. However, if the sale is “shelo beachrayut” (without responsibility), the seller does not need to compensate the buyer.

In the latter case (shelo beachrayut), if the lender takes the property from the buyer, the buyer has the right to complain to the seller. The seller’s right to be free from this complaint has significant halachic implications:

Usually, when there is a dispute between two parties, only the involved parties can argue their case. If a third party wants to bring a claim or seek a solution on behalf of one of the litigants, the other party can dismiss them by saying, “Go away; I am not legally answerable to you.”⁵⁰

However, since the buyer has grounds to complain, the seller has a right to be involved in the matter as he does not want the house taken from the buyer. Therefore, the seller can attempt to find a solution and reach an agreement. The lender cannot dismiss the seller’s claims in court:

Even if Reuven sold Shimon the field with no guarantee, he can also join in the deliberations and attempt to forestall the repossession of the land. This is because Reuven can say to the creditor: It is not amenable to me that Shimon will have a grievance against me for having sold him land that was then repossessed.⁵¹
– Ketubot 92b

The halachic ramifications of taromet

Conflict of interest – does avoiding a complaint make one’s testimony biased?

Regarding a sale that is “shelo beachrayut” (meaning the seller is not obligated to compensate the buyer if the property is seized as collateral), the Talmud (Bava Batra 43a) states that the seller cannot testify on behalf of the buyer to claim the property belongs to him.⁵² The reason for this is that the seller is not an impartial witness; he stands to benefit if the property remains with the buyer. If the seller owes someone money, the creditor can seize the property to settle the debt. However, if the buyer does not retain the property, the seller loses this potential advantage:

Ravin bar Shmuel says in the name of Shmuel: One who sells a field to another even without a guarantee that if the field will be repossessed the seller will compensate the buyer for his loss cannot testify with regard to ownership of that field on behalf of the buyer, because he is establishing the field before his creditor.⁵³

Tosafot⁵⁴ raises the question of why the Talmud specifies that a seller cannot testify on behalf of the buyer due to his interest in “establishing the field before his creditor” when, regardless of financial gain, the seller would naturally have a vested interest in avoiding the buyer’s complaints if the buyer were to lose the property. Tosafot provides two answers:

First, Tosafot suggests that the seller’s interest in avoiding complaints from the buyer is insufficient to disqualify him as a witness.

Second, Tosafot offers an alternate explanation: the case in question involves a scenario where the buyer knows the property originally belonged to the seller, so there is no basis for complaint. The buyer understands that the third party’s claim is fraudulent, and thus, if the third party successfully seizes the property, the buyer would not blame the seller. Therefore, if avoiding complaints were the only issue, the seller’s testimony would be acceptable.

According to the first answer, the buyer’s right to complain does not make the seller, who is subject to the complaint, a biased witness. According to the second answer, the only reason not to disqualify the testimony due to taromet is that the buyer would have no grounds for complaint, knowing the sale was legitimate and the accusation is fraudulent. Typically, avoiding complaints could disqualify someone from being a witness on grounds of partiality.

If the seller has another field that he has not sold, he would not gain from the property remaining with the buyer since any debt would be settled using the other field. According to the first answer, the seller would be considered impartial and thus a valid witness. According to the second answer, the seller would still be biased because the buyer would complain to the seller if he loses the case.

The Piskei Tosafot⁵⁵ (on Bava Batra 155) states that the seller is still considered impartial and thus a valid witness. However, according to the Machaneh Ephraim’s (Edut 5) interpretation of the Tur, a person can be disqualified from testifying if their testimony would free them from complaints. The Chatam Sofer (Shut Choshen Mishpat 112), based on this Tosafot,⁵⁶ and similarly the Chidushei Harim (Choshen Mishpat 37:3) assume that avoiding complaints is not grounds for partiality and would not disqualify a witness.⁵⁷This debate can be seen as part of a larger discussion on the definition of “impartiality” and whether only financial gain constitutes a “bias” or if other forms of gain, such as psychological benefits (e.g., not being considered a “wicked” person that does not repay a debt), can also be considered biases. It can however also be viewed as a dispute on the legitimacy of complaints and whether they should carry halachic weight in determining issues in a financial court.⁵⁸

“Reagreement” and complaints: adhering to the original contract

Similarly, when an employer or a worker backs out of a contract and later agrees to continue with it, if there have been changes in the average wage in the meantime, do those changes affect the agreement, or does the employer continue to pay the worker the originally agreed-upon amount?

This question refers to a scenario where this issue has not been discussed in advance. Essentially, it asks whether it is assumed that the new agreement is based on the original contract terms.⁵⁹

According to the Nimukei Yosef,⁶⁰ if the complaint about backing out of the contract is not legitimate (i.e., not a valid “taromet”), we cannot assume that the re-agreement relates to the original contract. Instead, we must assume that the withdrawal was final and that the new agreement represents a new contract, following the current market rate. For example, if the workers backed out and the employer later persuaded them to accept the work after wages had increased, the workers would still receive the originally agreed-upon wage. Conversely, if the employer backed out and the workers eventually convinced him to accept the contract after wages had decreased, the employer would still need to pay the original wage, as it is assumed that the original terms are being followed.

If the complaint regarding the contract withdrawal is not valid, we can assume that the re-agreement represents a new contract, and the market price at the time of the new agreement should be followed unless otherwise specified.

This suggests⁶¹ that a valid complaint keeps the contract alive. If the complaint is not legitimate, the contract would be considered void. However, if it is a valid taromet, the right to complain keeps the contract active, and any re-agreement would follow the terms of the ongoing contract.⁶²

The weight of complaint in financial law

When someone borrows an item, the general understanding is that once he starts using it or takes possession of it, he becomes the borrower, and it is in his custody. If the item breaks, even without his fault, he must repay its value because it broke while under his care.⁶³

The Raavad⁶⁴ offers an interesting perspective: he argues that even a verbal agreement to borrow the item establishes the borrower as the item’s temporary owner from the moment of the agreement. While it is true that the lender can change their mind, “as long as they do not retract, the item is considered loaned through the verbal agreement.”

As proof, the Raavad cites the Talmud, which states that the lender can complain if they change their mind. From this, the Raavad deduces that the lender’s retraction is improper because the loan is already in effect.

For the Raavad, taromet is significant, at least to the extent that it indicates a legitimate transaction. The fact that the lender can complain after changing their mind suggests that the loan has already been granted, and retracting it is akin to taking the loan back, not just refusing to give it.

Other halachic ramifications

The Chatam Sofer (Choshen Mishpat 122) discusses a case of a servant who left her job, leaving behind gold rings. The employer allegedly did not want to return them because the servant quit. The Chatam Sofer makes a case that since the servant likely tried to appease the employer, we can assume that the rings were left as a form of severance gift. It appears that the Chatam Sofer considers the weight of a complaint (taromet) serious enough to have significant halachic consequences. Therefore, we can assume that the gold rings were left to alleviate a complaint.

Similarly, if someone makes a late payment or repayment, they cannot be asked to pay extra for the delay, as this would constitute interest, which is prohibited. However, there is an opinion⁶⁵ that if the borrower wants to appease the lender, they are allowed to give more money. The reasoning is that this additional money is not considered interest since it is not paid for the time the money was held but rather to avoid complaints.

We previously mentioned that while one can repay a debt in small installments, the recipient has the right to complain. Generally, one is obligated to help and lend money to others. However, if the manner of repayment is grounds for a taromet, the lender is not obligated to lend the money.⁶⁶

There are many more examples of its halachic significance.⁶⁷

Not every complaint qualifies as a valid “taromet.”

As has been evident, not all complaints are justified enough to be considered a taromet. Some lack sufficient merit to fit the definition of a valid grievance.⁶⁸

The Trumat HaDeshen (responsum 308) discusses a case where someone sends an agent with money to pay for something. When the principal goes to the store to pick it up, the storekeeper claims they were not paid, while the agent insists that he made the payment. The agent swore before the court that he handed the money to the storekeeper. The agent wanted the storekeeper to also swear that he never received the money. Is such a demand justified?

In his responsum, the Trumat HaDeshen raises the possibility that to avoid a taromet, someone may demand an oath. This is based on the Talmudic argument that if someone sells something “shelo beachrayut” (without liability) and the debtor tries to reclaim the property from the buyer, the seller has the right to intervene to avoid a taromet.

However, the Trumat HaDeshen does not accept this comparison. He acknowledges that one may have the right to demand an oath to avoid a taromet, but only if the complaint is legitimate. When someone sells a house, and due to the seller’s debt, the property is at risk of being taken from the buyer, the buyer can rightfully complain to the seller because he is losing the house due to the seller’s fault.

On the other hand, if the agent has already sworn that he handed the money to the storekeeper, he has done everything necessary to prove his innocence. In this situation, the principle has no grounds to complain, and the agent cannot demand an oath based solely on this “taromet.”

There are, however, other opinions (see, for example, Shut Mahari HaLevi 19, Kitvei HaBach uGdolei Doro, at the end of the responsum) that maintain an oath can be demanded even for this complaint. Since the storekeeper is not delivering the goods, and the agent’s oath absolves him from returning the money, this results in a loss for the principal. This understandable hostility and legitimate complaint towards the agent justifies the demand for the oath.

Similarly, a complaint is only legitimate when someone is compelled into a situation. If someone willingly incurs a loss, they cannot then legitimately complain about it. For example, if someone accepts the return of a purchase out of kindness, although not legally obligated, they have no right to complain because they could have refused. Likewise, if someone accepts an inconvenient form of payment, although not required to do so, they have no grounds to complain since they could have declined it.⁶⁹

Taromet when the concern was alleviated:

The Talmud (Bava Metzia 79a) states that if someone rents a donkey and it dies, and he easily finds another donkey, he does not have the right to complain. This suggests that a complaint is unwarranted if no damage is caused by the wrongdoing of the party subject to the taromet.

Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rav says: In the case of one who rents a donkey to ride on it and it died halfway through the journey, the renter gives the owner his fee for half of the journey, but the renter has nothing but a grievance against the owner. He has no legal claim against the owner over the fact that he now has to go to great trouble to find another donkey. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a place where donkeys are available for rent, what is the purpose of this grievance? He does not have any cause for grievance in this case, as he can simply rent another donkey and has not lost anything.⁷⁰

The argument could be made that the legitimacy of the complaint hinges on the negative outcome of the wrongdoing. We do however find sources indicating that when someone backs out of an agreement, and the concerns underlying the complaint turn out to be unfounded, the complainant is still entitled to the grievance. For instance, if a renter (tenant) switches and replaces himself with another person, and that second person has to pay the fare for the remainder of the rental, the original renter (landlord) has the right to complain. Concerns might include: he doesn’t know the second person and might have to chase him for the money, the second person might not pay on time or that he will be less careful with that which was rented (property). Even if these concerns prove false and the second person is responsible and pays on time, the original renter (landlord) still has the right to complain.⁷¹

However, an argument can be made that in such a case, the landlord does lose that right if, in the end, everything turns out to be fine.⁷²

Additionally, as previously noted, there is an opinion that if reneging does not cause a loss, there is no basis for taromet. Similarly as mentioned above when backing out of a deal does not cause significant inconvenience, “it can be argued that the inconvenience would not be sufficient cause for complaint.”⁷³

[In addition there is an opinion that only regarding a boat can he complain about having to deal with a new person, because he will have to live with him, together. But when renting property he does not need to live with him, thus he does not have the right to complain, and similarly there are many opinions regarding his legitimacy to complain.⁷⁴]

Illegitimate taromet

The Talmud occasionally dismisses complaints it deems unfounded. One such example is the above mentioned passage regarding “one who rents a donkey… and it died halfway through the journey.” The Talmud comments: “If this is referring to a place where donkeys are available for rent, what is the purpose of this grievance?”

Similarly, regarding workers who agreed to a lower rate than that which the employer initially offered, the Talmud questions the validity of their complaint since they willingly accepted these terms:

If the employer said to him: Hire for me laborers at four dinars, and he went and told them that they are hired for three dinars, what is the relevance of this grievance? After all, they knew and accepted the conditions of their hire. What grounds for complaint do they have?⁷⁵

Rabbi Yisrael Salanter⁷⁶ deduced from this that there are religious rules even for grievances. There are specific guidelines for when and why we can “have taromet,” with whom we can express it, and under what circumstances. We are expected to conduct our lives, including its emotional and psychological aspects, in accordance with principles derived from the Talmud.⁷⁷

What Does “Taromet” Mean?

“Taromet” is usually understood as animosity or a grudge. It represents a type of complaint or accusational claim against someone that, while not holding much legal weight, carries emotional or personal significance. The feelings of the complainer may be legitimate and even recognized by the court. In certain cases, these feelings might even be given some legal consideration. However, the complaint itself does not constitute a legal claim. Therefore, the responsibility to avoid taromet, as well as the permission to have it, falls within the realms of ethics and religious law, rather than being a legal matter defined by the judicial system.

Some rabbis understand taromet as permission⁷⁸ to get angry, hold a grudge, and feel animosity. Without this permission, it would be forbidden to be angry and to express such feelings.⁷⁹

Additionally, in general, speaking negatively about others is considered wrong. Spreading negative information, even if true, is forbidden and known as “lashon hara” (evil speech). However, in the case of taromet, one could argue that permission is granted to complain.⁸⁰

Holding animosity also seems contrary to Jewish principles. It is forbidden to take revenge, and even when helping someone instead of seeking revenge, it is forbidden to mention that revenge could have been taken. Yet, in the case of taromet, permission is granted to retain resentment, and possibly even to take revenge.⁸¹

Additionally, taromet allows the wronged individual to complain to and confront the person responsible.⁸² Rabbi Zonenfeld went as far as to suggest that it may permits the victim to curse him.⁸³ Rabbi Heinkin suggested; maybe it serves as some form of a verbal enforcement of justice.⁸⁴

Taromet can also be understood as a reaction to being wronged. People have a certain right and ownership over their feelings;⁸⁵ they are entitled not to be insulted. When wronged, they have the right to demand compensation, similar to how someone who owns an object damaged by another has the right to be compensated. This damage might be emotional, so the compensation may not necessarily be financial, but demanding it is the purpose of the complaint.⁸⁶ Rabbi Yisrael Salanter understood the complaint to function as some sort of a suit, not a financial one rather a “taromet” one.⁸⁷ He argued that just like one that forgives a debt can not later sue for it to be paid back, similarly one that forgives the other party can not later “sue the taromet”.

Taromet can also be viewed as a financial claim rather than merely an emotional demand for compensation, or as traditionally understood; an understandable or permissible grudge or resentment.⁸⁸

Rabbi Joseph D. Epstein referred to it as a “financial claim in the laws of the heart.” He explained that although traditionally understood as resentment, taromet could be seen as a legitimate financial claim. “Even though one cannot sue in beit din (the court of law), in the laws of the heart there is a valid lawsuit.”⁸⁹

It can also be understood as the right to be appeased financially or otherwise:⁹⁰

The responsibility to avoid taromet

Amongst classical baalei musar (ethical teachers), complaining is considered a really negative attribute. This is discussed by Rabbeinu Yonah (in Shaarei Teshuva⁹¹ and his commentary on Proverbs). The verse says, “The words of a querulous man are bruising; They penetrate one’s inmost parts.”⁹² Rabbis interpreting this verse discuss the negative consequences for both the person criticized and the complainer.⁹³

The Talmud offers an interesting comment on a case from the Mishna that we have already mentioned:

Until when is it permitted for one to return a worn coin once he realizes that it is defective?… If the one who gave the coin to the aggrieved party recognized it, he must accept it back from him even after twelve months have passed no matter how little the erosion affected its value. And he has only a grievance against him…⁹⁴
…Rav Ḥisda said: The Sages taught an attribute of piety here, according to which he must accept it even after considerable time has passed. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And he has only a grievance against him. For whom is there a grievance? If it is for the pious person who accepted the return of the flawed coin although he was not required to accept it, and is teaching that he may have a grievance against the one who requested of him to accept the coin, let him not accept the coin from him and let him not have a grievance.

Rashi comments that it is better not to perform an act of piety if it results in a grievance, than to do it and then speak badly about the person (slander/calumnies⁹⁵). The Kad haKemach⁹⁶ concludes from this that even if someone is required to perform an act of piety, he should not do so if it leads to a grievance. This applies even more so if the act of piety is not required. One should always act in a way that prevents animosity towards others. Furthermore, expressing negativity verbally is forbidden, and Rashi’s phrase “than to do it and speak bad about him” refers to emotional “slander” or internal resentment.⁹⁷

Derekh Eretz Zuta (1 and 9) advises: “Refrain from grumbling lest you grumble against others and be led into further sin.”⁹⁸ Similarly, Kallah Rabbati (3 and 5) states: “refrain from grumbling.”⁹⁹

The sages suggest avoiding complaints as they can lead to negative consequences. These sources could be interpreted to mean that one should avoid both complaining and being the subject of complaints. Although this is not the straightforward reading, it reflects an additional perspective.¹⁰⁰

Supporting this idea,¹⁰¹ the Prisha (Choshen Mishpat 183:2) understands Rashi and the Ran to suggest that one should alleviate any grounds for grievances. The Noam Elimelech¹⁰² writes that for interpersonal matters (e.g., if someone has been wronged), Yom Kippur does not atone because there is a “heavenly accusation”.¹⁰³ As long as the friend is not appeased, the accusation remains. Therefore, if one is subject to a grievance, they should appease their friend to address this heavenly accusation.

The Talmud tells a story:

Rav was reciting the Torah portion before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Ḥiyya, Rav’s uncle and teacher, came in, whereupon Rav returned to the beginning of the portion and began to read it again. Afterward, bar Kappara came in, and Rav returned to the beginning of the portion out of respect for bar Kappara. Then Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, came in, and he returned again to the beginning of the portion. Then, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama came in, and Rav said to himself: Shall I go back and read so many times? He did not return but continued from where he was. Rabbi Ḥanina was offended. Rav went before Rabbi Ḥanina on Yom Kippur eve every year for thirteen years to appease him, but he would not be appeased.¹⁰⁴

The Sfat Emet¹⁰⁵ comments that before Yom Kippur, one should always try to appease those with grievance against them, even if the complaint is not necessarily justified. However, this story can also be understood¹⁰⁶ as involving a legitimate but non-sinful act that caused a grievance, indicating the importance of seeking reconciliation for such actions before Yom Kippur.¹⁰⁷

Regarding taromet and whether one should seek to appease the complainant, there are differing opinions. The Talmid HaRashba¹⁰⁸ believed that, in the interest of piety, it is proper to pay the full amount of the grievance.

The Shulchan Arukh (Choshen Mishpat 326) states:

A person rents a field from a colleague under a sharecropping agreement with the intent of sowing sesame seeds, but instead, sows wheat. If the field produces a crop of wheat that is worth the same as the yield of sesame seeds could have been expected to be worth, he¹⁰⁹ may have no more than complaints against him.¹¹⁰

Generally, sesame damages the field more but is more profitable, while wheat is less damaging but less profitable. In this case, the renter worked hard to make the wheat as profitable as sesame without the associated damage. The Meirat Enayim explains¹¹¹ that it is the renter who has the complaint; he seeks compensation or payment for the benefit the owner gained by the renter planting wheat instead of sesame. In his book Prisha, he explains that although the owner is not legally required to compensate the renter, if the owner wants to be free from the complaint, he should appease the renter (financially).

Earlier, we noted that the Chatam Sofer, in a case of grievance, argued for the possibility of assuming that something was left behind to appease the aggrieved party. Similarly, some believe that late repayments can include extra money to appease without it being considered interest. Some even argue¹¹² that courts may compel prominent individuals or institutions to compensate for grievances.¹¹³

However, other rabbis maintain that even piety does not require financial appeasement, only verbal.¹¹⁴ Rabbi Yisrael Salanter believed the purpose of the complaint is to seek appeasement, and once received, forgiveness should follow.

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

1
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/law-and-morality
2
Regarding the meaning of taromet (or taaromet) see jastrow:
“תַּרְעוֹמֶת f. (רָעַם) murmur, complaint, quarrel. B. Mets. VI, 1 אין להם … אלא ת׳ they have nothing but a complaint (no legal claim) against each other. Ib. 76ᵃ ת׳ מאי עבידתיה what cause for complaint is there? [Answ. אמר ליה לית לך אל תמנע וכ׳ he may say to him, dost thou not believe in (Prov. III, 27), ‘withhold not a benefit &c.’?] Y. ib. V, 10ᵇ המבטל כיס … אלא ת׳ if an agent leaves his neighbor’s money unemployed, the latter has no legal claim; ib. IX, beg. 12ᵃ, opp. חייב לשפות. Sabb. 56ᵇ לא עליך יש לי ת׳ וכ׳ (ed. תרעומות) I have no quarrel with thee, but only with him &c.; Yalk. Sam. 151. Treat. Der. Er. Zuṭṭa ch. IX, beg. התרחק מן הת׳ וכ׳ keep aloof from murmuring (talking against a fellowman), for if thou talkest against thy neighbor, thou wilt commit other sins too. Ber. 12ᵃ בקשו … מפני ת׳ המינין they wanted to read so (recite the Ten Commandments with the Sh’mʿa in the prayers), had they not long ago abolished it on account of the seditious talk of the heretics (who declared nothing to be essential in the Law but the Ten Commandments); a. fr.—Pl. תַּרְעוּמוֹת. Tosef. Sot. VI, 1 ושאר כל הת׳ האמורות וכ׳ and all the other murmurings (against God) mentioned in that section (Job XXVII).”
https://www.sefaria.org/Jastrow%2C_%D7%AA%D6%B7%D6%BC%D7%A8%D6%B0%D7%A2%D7%95%D6%B9%D7%9E%D6%B6%D7%AA.1?lang=bi
There are many more cases of taromet not mentioned in this article, see for instance, Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 66:16.
3
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/law-and-morality
4
See later on, that this is referring to the legitimacy of the complaint, in addition it could be a halachic permission to complain.
5
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia.6.1?ven=Mishnah_Yomit_by_Dr._Joshua_Kulp&vhe=Torat_Emet_357&lang=bi
6
Bava Metzia 76a.
7
See Chidushei Haritva Hachadashim, Bava Metzia 75b (on the Mishna), he brings other possible psychological factors, in a case when it is the employer or the worker that deceives the other by reneging. Examples like: people will think badly…
8
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.76a.9?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
9
Similar to this:
“Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rav says: In the case of one who rents a donkey to ride on it and it died halfway through the journey, the renter gives the owner his fee for half of the journey, but the renter has nothing but a grievance against the owner. He has no legal claim against the owner over the fact that he now has to go to great trouble to find another donkey.”
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.79a.4?lang=bi&with=Steinsaltz&lang2=en
10
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia.4.6?ven=Mishnah_Yomit_by_Dr._Joshua_Kulp&lang=bi
11
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.77b.18?lang=bi
12
See later on whether this applies even in a case where the second person is also easy to work with.
13
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Hiring.5.4?vhe=Torat_Emet_363&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
14
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Agents_and_Partners.1.5?vhe=Torat_Emet_363&lang=bi
Or similarly “When a person gives a colleague money to purchase produce, with the profits to be split among them, and the colleague fails to do so, all the investor has against him are complaints.”
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Agents_and_Partners.7.6?vhe=Torat_Emet_363&lang=bi
And see Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 177:40 (and Choshen Mishpat 183:1) and see Tosefta Bava Metzia (Lieberman) 4:22.
15
See for instance: Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 183:1.
16
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Ownerless_Property_and_Gifts.7.6?vhe=Torat_Emet_363&lang=bi
This is the Rambam’s ruling, it is based on the Talmud in Bava Batra 145b:
“If he was far away and did not hear the sound of the drum, the betrothed man should have informed him. If he did not inform him, the recipient has a grievance against the betrothed man because he did not inform him about the wedding,”
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Batra.145b.4?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=he
17
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.49a.5?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
18
See for instance: Me’irat Einayim (on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat) 333:1, and Ketzot HaChoshen (on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat) 221:1.
It is worth noting that some argue in favor of legitimate cause to complain even if someone reneges for a completely just reason, see for instance; Siach Avraham, Bava Metzia p. 293. In addition see; Daat Mishpat, Choshen Mishpat 333:1, 3, that there may be an argument between the Ketzot and the Sme whether if one reneges with a valid and legitimate reason (and of course does not commit a sin of any sort by doing so), is subject to taromet. And see; Chalat Dvash, Choshen Mishpat Vol. 1, p. 99a.
19
See for instance Nimukei Yosef on Bava Metzia 47a (Rif’s pages) that if the employer backs out of a deal before the workers have started their work, being that they can just find another job, they do not even have a legitimate complaint. And see Melo Haroim Vol. 1 letter shin, Schirut Poalim (in specific 3).
20
The simple reading of Tur and Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 333:1. However, see Shach, and see the Melo Haroim mentioned in the previous footnote. In addition see a footnote later at the end of the paragraph titled “Taromet when the concern was alleviated” regarding “legitimacy to complain”, and that it is effort caused based.
21
See for instance Mitzvat Hamussar (taromet).
22
Seemingly a good example for this would be; backing out of a gift. Regarding this see for instance; Sikumei Sugyot, Schirut Poalim p. 5, and see Hearot Mibnei Hachabura (Kolel Nachlat Moshe), Bava Metzia 75b (this also seems to be the position of Rabbi Epstein in Mitzvat Hamussar (taromet), however he does at the end acknowledge that there might be a category of taromet that is not financial, and see Hayashar Vehatov, Vol. 17, p. 16, however that seems to not be a good proof.). However it constitutes an act of bad faith, at least if it is not a big gift (see mechusar amana).
[And see; Shaarei Shlomo (Grossman) 69, that it seems that although one is mechusar amana, if reneging did not create a major inconvenience, it does not warrant a taromet.]
However, see Tosefta Gittin (Lieberman) 3, and the context at which it is quoted in the Talmud: Bava Metzia 49a (it is also in the Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot 1:1), and see Otzar Geonim Hachadash, Baba Batra p. 225, and Sefer haAruch “matan” (And see; Mishnat Hahanchala, 3, footnote 10, that claims that being and he has a right to complain, it must mean it is his, this is similar to the Raavad quoted in the article.). And see Ketzot Hachoshen 22:1.
In addition see Rema; Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 226:1 that if someone gave a gift “shelo beachrayut”, and the gift was a collateral, if his (the gifters) debtor took it from the recipient of the gift, the recipient does not have the right to complain (as opposed to if it was a sale). However this is different to the taromet of someone that retracts on their words. [In addition there are those that may not agree with the Rema; See for instance Ravia (Shut, siman 935), baba batra 44a]. And see achronim (for instance Reshimot Shiurim Bava Kama Vol. 2, 108b) that to make someone a “bal davar” {litigant} it needs to be that the taromet is his debt, and he is already a “bal davar” and the taromet just adds the “negiut” {partiality}, this would obviously not apply to a gift, however for other purposes of taromet a gift would qualify.
23
See; Shach 333:1. In addition see Shut Shevet Halevi Vol. 7, 236:6, and see Hayashar veHatov Vol. 16 p. 109.
24
See; Chidushei Haritva Hachadashim Bava Metzia 79b (also quoted in the Shita Mekubetzet). It is also a common understanding of the Talmudic phrase (Bava Metzia 79b) “shinuy da’ata”, see for example Shita Mekubetzet there, quoting Talmid Rabbeinu Peretz. In addition see, Teshuvot Maharik 9 (and he quotes Rabbeinu Tam “that he causes him to have to suffer through another man’s wisdom that he is not yet accustomed to”). See however; Rashi there.
25
Later in the article we will expound on this.
26
This is the translation from the english Talmud quoted above
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.76a.9?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
27
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma.81b.20?lang=bi
28
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Hiring.5.5?lang=bi
29
See; Bava Batra 22b, and Rashi there.
“Rather, Rava said that this is what the mishna is teaching: In a case of one whose wall was near the wall of another at a distance of four cubits and it fell, he may not place another wall close to his neighbor’s wall unless he distances the wall four cubits from it. What is the reason that this distance must be observed? The reason is that walking here benefits there, i.e., the ground is strengthened by people walking on the land in the area between the walls.”

https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Batra.22b?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
30
See for instance: Chiddushei Ramban on Bava Batra 22b. (However this has greater significance than merely the right to complain, see the commentaries there, this is like: “kofin al midat sodom”, and “ve’asita hayashar vehatov”.)
31
See Bach, Choshen Mishpat 183:1 that the principle relies less on a friend than on his agent/messenger, and nonetheless even by a friend he has the right to complain. And Kiddushin 59a.
32
https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Bava_Metzia.5.3.5?vhe=The_Jerusalem_Talmud,_edition_by_Heinrich_W._Guggenheimer._Berlin,_De_Gruyter,_1999-2015&lang=bi&p2=Tosefta_Kifshutah_on_Bava_Metzia.4.22.1&lang2=bi
This is from Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:3, it is a quote from the Tosefta (see about this in length Tosefta Bava Metzia (Lieberman) 4:22, and in Tosefta Kifshutah on Bava Metzia 4:22).
33
There can be other sources for Rebbi Isaac saying this. See
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98%D7%9C_%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95_%D7%A9%D7%9C_%D7%97%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95#:~:text=%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98%D7%9C%20%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95%20%D7%A9%D7%9C%20%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%95%20%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%95,%D7%95%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9A%20%D7%9C%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA%20%D7%A2%D7%9C%20%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%95%D7%97
34
See for example Tur, Choshen Mishpat 183. The following talmudic passage “treated him in a deceitful manner” means that he is a swindler, see the Tur, Shulchan Aruch, and commentaries to Choshen Mishpat 183:1-2.
35
https://www.sefaria.org/Kiddushin.58b.14?lang=bi and later on the next page.
36
In their commentaries on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 183 (and see also in Prisha). It is also listed as a dispute between them in the later commentaries there, see for instance; Netivot HaMishpat, Hidushim, and Ba’er Hetev.
37
See for instance; Damesek Eli‘ezer (Perlmutter) 119. And see there that he would possibly suggest that when someone does not fulfill what he agreed to with regard to getting him the girl, he is not even subject to criticism. And similarly see; Reshimat Shiurim (Kalmenson) Kiddushin, 4.
38
https://www.sefaria.org/Kiddushin.59a.6?lang=bi
39
It should be noted that the Rambam, in Mishneh Torah, Ishut 9:17 refers to this too (the one that made the purchase before the pauper as well as the messenger that married the girl for himself) as a “rasha”:
“When a man appoints an agent to consecrate a woman for him, and the agent goes and consecrates her for himself, the woman is consecrated to the agent. It is, however, forbidden to do such a thing. Whoever does this or performs a similar act with regard to business matters is considered to be wicked.”
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Marriage.9.17?lang=bi
On Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 35, the Beit Shmuel (20), comments: “the Rambam wrote that he is considered a rasha”. As did many more including Rabbi Abraham Palacci; Avraham Et Yado 85c (however see that he wrote in Hachafetz Chayim 45, that it only applies after he was “mekadesh”, and see there too that possibly one is not considered wicked for taking something before someone else, if it is a mitzvah {like marriage – having kids}).
Similarly see Noda BiYhudah II, Even HaEzer 72 that wicked and swindler are different ways of saying the same thing (he however understands the “wickedness” to not be the same as the case with the pauper, rather the sin is lying), and Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 118 (par. amnam) (and many others). However in his (the Chatam Sofer’s) commentary on Bava Batra 21b, he writes that they are different (swindler and wicked), in that when he sends a messenger he has not invested himself to make the person that takes it from him a wicked man. In addition many others understand “swindler” to be less serious than “wicked”, see for instance; Meiri on Kiddushin 58b that it is only swindler-ness, and one is only wicked if the victim is poor. And see Halakhot Ketanot 286, that he is only a swindler, and among his explanations, that one is not wicked if the thing at question is not merely an object, rather a person that can choose not to want the first man, rather the second. And see; Arukh HaShulchan, Even HaEzer 35:29, and see Divrei Malkiel (Vol. 2, 2) that understood that even the Rambam would not say that he is wicked. And see; Attia, Isaac ben Isaiah, in Mishrat Moshe, ishut 9:17 (v’agav), and Yisah Berakha 147d and the Atzamot Yosef (Joseph ibn Ezra) he quotes (Kiddushin 59) that argues similar to the Chatam Sofer, that when he himself is invested then one is wicked for swooping in, however if he is home and sends someone else to go and buy it, swooping in merely constitutes swindler-ness.
40
See Rabbi Joseph Birdugo, in his book Divrei Yosef (Even Haezer 33) that was at first in doubt but eventually agreed to this. It’s also worth noting that he does mention other considerations like for instance that perhaps there being another person involved (the women) that changes things, perhaps she likes the second guy, furthermore, if he likes her, and wants specifically her he would lose out by not pursuing it (the marriage), thus not comparable. And see the previous footnote.
41
This might be a printing mistake though, for both sources he quotes (the above mentioned Halakhot Ketanot and Shemesh Tzedaka, Even Haezer 6) as proof that it is not comparable to taking the bread from the poor person, write that there is a complaint. I was thinking it is possible that the printers mistook “אין לו עליו אלא תרעומת” for “אין לו עליו אפי’ תרעומת”. However it is also possible, that he would not believe there is a right to complaint for multiple reasons, it is possible he agrees with the Noda Biyehuda (mentioned above) that it is only wrong in the Talmud since he was sent as a messenger, in rabbi Birdugo’s case he was never sent as an agent, rather he pursued a girl engaged to his friend. I was thinking that perhaps it is also possible that even if this does constitute swindlerness perhaps it does not warrant a complaint, since with the matters of the heart one can not be blamed, and when someone has a great reason he is exempt from complaint (for instance; Ketzot HaChoshen 333:1).
However see; Ketzot HaChoshen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 221:1 regarding a man that promised a certain amount of money to his finance, and the Ketzot claims that between a man and a woman there is no taromet. (Similarly see; Machatzit Hashekel {Yagid} Even Haezer 29, on Beit Shmuel 21.)
42
See for instance; Be’er Halakha (Sabag), 64 p. 423. And see; Pitchei Teshuva on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 237, and Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 237, that in such a case he is not considered wicked.
43
There are many other cases when one is not required to return the pursued thing, or when someone is not considered wicked for pursuing something someone else is interested in, for this see Tur, Shulchan Arukh and commentaries, Choshen Mishpat 237, and see Shut Tzemach Tzedek, Choshen Mishpat 37. In many cases it is “mutar lechatchila” (completely permissible).
44
There are many discussions regarding preventing others from gain, and when/whether it constitutes a liability.
For instance there is an argument; whether he is liable if the potential gain is guaranteed, if however the potential gain is uncertain he is only subject to complaint, or if even if the gain is guaranteed he is still not liable for the potential damage (for this position see for instance: Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 292:15, quoting the Maharshal).
If someone hires workers and then changes his mind, and reneges; if the workers can not find a new job, he needs to pay them (not the amount of agreement, rather only the amount of a “poel batel”). The Panim Meirot (Vol. 2, 82) pointed out that while it is only preventing gain, he is still liable, since the “loss” is clear (see in the footnote quoted from the Netziv {if not it is a “hezek sheeno nikar” and not liable}). He argued similarly in a case where someone held onto someone’s merchandise during the time of the market, and returned it after when people are not buying. He claimed this would fall into the category of damage and not merely preventing gain. Many other rabbis hold a similar position (that when the damage is guaranteed he is liable), see for instance; Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 61:10, and Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 178 (in addition see the Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 292:20).
Similarly the Ra’avyah (Sefer Ra’avyah 956 or 957, in ver. Deblitzki p. 216) argues if somebody prevents gain in a way that is “in the hands” of the victim to create a clear (or probable/certain) gain, he is liable to compensate, for example if someone affects someone else’s field so that it will not produce the same gain, being and it is up to the owner of the field to work and create the profit, and it is highly unlikely that there would be a drought, he can demand compensation regardless of whether he ends up working the field. If however it is dependent on someone else to create the potential profit, he can not demand money for the damages.
Regarding workers that could not find a new job, and the employer needs to pay them, in Shut Maharam (Prague 921) and see Ketzot HaChoshen 333:2 (and 3): he argues that law would only apply in a case with a kinyan. Like where they went some place for the job, possibly “going” can constitute a kinyan, making the employer liable for reneging (see the following Ketzot 333:3 quoting the Nimukei Yosef (and obviously the Nimukei Yosef, Bava Metzia 46a) and https://www.kby.org/hebrew/torat-yavneh/view.asp?id=7235 and in addition see Tehilat Yitzchak (Adler) 77:4, and it does seem compelling (that the Maharam would think this) since the Talmud (Braita, Bava Metzia 76b) says: “In what case is this statement said? When they did not go to the workplace… But if donkey drivers went and… the employer must give them…”), however without a kinyan, merely for not being able to find a new job, he does not need to pay anything.
Similarly if what has been “lost” is something that can not be returned, like time spent, some might argue that it would need to be paid for, see for instance; (Nimukei Yosef on Bava Metzia 46a and b).
We see from these sources arguments to be made in favor of not having legal obligations to pay if: there was no kinyan (did not move locations), the prevention of gain is guaranteed and clear, it is in his own capacity to do the work and not reliant on others, in addition the Ketzot suggests the possibility of distinguishing between people and his possessions, thus preventing someone from making money by preventing his ability to work would need to be compensated, however preventing his property from gaining might not (however he does not seem to entirely accept this). In addition the Rashba (Shut Vol. 3, 227 (ver. Bnei Brak p. 138)) writes that if someone agreed to pay for all damages, he does not need to pay for the prevention of gain.
The Ritva (Shita Mekubetzet and Chidushei haRitva on Bava Metzia 73b) argues that the reason for the obligation to pay in certain cases of reneging as it pertains to an agreement between an employer and workers, is based on a social contract; they want the other party to rely on them, and with that pleasure of being relied on comes the responsibility of paying in certain cases. It may not be a compensation of damages, rather more similar to the nature of a “guarantor”.
See mákin veonsin that the rabbis often introduced financial laws which do not follow the regular (or biblical) monetary regulations, being and there is a need for it. The Netivot HaMishpat (Beurim 333:3) argues that it is possible that it (the liability of reneging in an agreement between workers and an employer) is this kind of an obligation for the reneging party to pay. In this case this would apply to cases which are common, that rabbis felt the need to protect people from this situation. The differences in the law (like being liable if the thing is “lost”) might be a part of the rabbinic law.
For more see; Pitchei Teshuva on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 292:5, and Chevel Nachlato 7:49. There were multiple compilations written on this subject see for instance; https://www.dintora.org/assets/files/65951517216469.pdf
There are other opinions regarding when it constitutes obligatory (damage) payment/compensation, and when it is merely a right to complain. For instance see the Pnei Moshe quoted in the article (among others) says that if he actively did something to prevent gain that is financially liable, as opposed to preventing others from gaining in a more passive way, like not returning money and as a consequence it couldn’t be invested.
In addition there are a lot of other issues that can play a role like if someone agrees to certain terms, or if someone is a worker and as a part of the job is lazy which causes loss of potential gain, perhaps he would be liable. This can be stipulated based on the Netivot HaMishpat mentioned above (Beurim 183:1), in addition if there is a due diligence of any sort (this could possibly be applied to a worker) see Divrei Malkiel Vol. 5, 222.
And see; Toda’a (alon leshabat kodesh) 5756, p. 15 (Noach) that when someone prevents gain from existing potential profit (like holding back someone’s money so they can not invest it) it is indirect damage, however when someone doesn’t make someone else a profit (like buying them something {or offering the higher wage the employer offered}) it would merely warrant a taromet.
45
Rosh on Bava Kamma 2:6. There are many others with this opinion, see for instance; Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 292:15, quoting the Maharshal, and Nimukei Yosef on Bava Kamma 8b. And see Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 58, and 178.
46
See diné sámájám.
47
Yekar Tiferet on Mishneh Torah, Shluchin V’shutfin 7:6. There are others that hold this opinion too, see for instance; Rabbi Yom Tov Tzahalon, in the end of responsum 95 https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=1144&st=&pgnum=188
The Avnei Nezer (Yore Deah 133:3) goes as far as to suggest that he could be “tofes” (withholding things as payment, something arguably possible if he is liable in heavenly court). Regarding the obligation in the heavenly court see diné sámájám.
48
See for instance; Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 61:10, and Bach there (Choshen Mishpat 61:7).
49
Yachin on Mishnah Bava Metzia 6:3. There are many others that share this position, see for instance; Imrei Binah (Auerbach), Sheelot Utshuvot 1:8:
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=7768&st=&pgnum=306
50
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Batra.30b.1?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
51
https://www.sefaria.org/Ketubot.92b.3?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
52
“This is in a case where a third party claims that this sold field is really his (and it was never the seller’s).”
https://www.sefaria.org/Tosafot_on_Bava_Batra.43a.4.1?lang=bi
53
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Batra.44b.11?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
54
https://www.sefaria.org/Tosafot_on_Bava_Batra.43a.4.1?lang=bi
55
Some believe it was written by the author of the Tur (Jacob ben Asher).
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%99_%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%AA#:~:text=%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%99%20%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%AA%20%D7%94%D7%95%D7%90%20%D7%97%D7%99%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%20%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9D,%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%98%D7%98%20%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA%20%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F%20%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%99%20%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94
56
The Chatam Sofer argued that since one is a “baal davar” (has a right to litigate) due to a complaint, but is still impartial, it logically follows that if someone is considered partial he is also a “baal davar”. To make this point it is possible that he was only relying on the one option in Tosafot, and he does not necessarily need to agree with it, however from the wording it seemed as though he thought of him as a kosher (impartial) witness.
57
In addition see; Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 37:21. Whether taromet discualifies someone from being a kosher witness, is a big subject, and see for instance; Mishpat Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 37:1, in footnote (Biurei Hamishpat) 37, and he references other places he wrote more on the subject.
58
See for instance p. 248 and there footnote 10: https://etzion.org.il/sites/default/files/Bava_Batra21-chezkat_habatim-nogeia_beeiduto.pdf
59
See; Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 221:2, and the Nimukei Yosef.
60
Nimukei Yosef on Bava Metzia 47a. And see Rema, Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 332:5.
61
See for instance; Mitzvat Hamussar (taromet).
62
In addition, see Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 221:2 that we assume he reagreed to the deal for the purpose of alleviating the grievance against him.
63
If it was in the owners care, like for instance if the borrower hires him to use it together with borrowing it, if he breaks it the owner is liable, but if he borrows it separately to hiring the owner, he has to pay the owner for it was in his care not the owners (Mishnah and Gemara Bava Metzia 94):
“In the case of one who borrowed a cow and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or he borrowed a cow and hired its owner with it, or he borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt from liability. Although a borrower is generally liable to pay if a cow he borrowed dies, here he is exempt, as it is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14).
But if one first borrowed the cow and only afterward borrowed the services of the owner or hired him, and the cow died, he is liable to pay the owner for the cow. This is the halakha even if the owner was working for the borrower at the time, as it is stated: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13).”
The Talmud questions the possibility of borrowing the object and hiring/borrowing the owner together with it:
“GEMARA: From the fact that the latter clause teaches: And afterward borrowed the cow, it may be inferred that when the first clause teaches: Borrowed its owner with it, the intention is: Literally with it, i.e., at the same moment. The Gemara asks: Can you find such a case where the owner obligates himself to serve the borrower literally with it? Given that one borrows the cow through pulling the cow and contracts the services of the owner through their verbal agreement…”
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.94b.2?lang=en&with=all&lang2=en
This is where the Raavad explains that the borrowing happens through the verbal agreement.
64
Shita Mekubetzet on Bava Metzia 94b. And see Bet Lechem Yehuda, Bava Metzia 94a that he asks whether taromet is the reason the speech creates the borrowing, or is only a proof.
65
See for instance; Shut Maharashdam, Yoreh De’ah 222 (end), and amongst modern rabbis; Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Minchat Shlomo kama, Yoreh De’ah 27 (2).
66
See for instance; Netiv Chesed on Ahavat Chesed, Part I, Laws of Loans 1:15.
67
See for example; Nachal Yitzchak {Spector} (Choshen Mishpat) 78, 2 anaf (4 and) 5 that usually when a workers finds something while a worker it may belong to the master, however if he reneged from the agreement he is not his worker thus may keep the finding. When reneging does not entitle the employer to have taromet towards the worker, we believe the worker he reneged, and he does not need to prove it, and can keep the found object, if however he is entitled to complain (or if there is a mechusar amana sort of a reason to assume he didn’t or most people wouldn’t renege), the worker can only keep it if he can prove he reneged. And see Halacha Pesuka, Schirut Poalim, 6 (chazarat poel) that he brings this and later brings more halachic ramifications (like regarding misleading a “kablan” in a case when he has the right to complain.)
68
And see Reshimat Shiurim (Soloveitchik), Yevamot 5b, footnote 204 quoting the rabbi (Soloveitchik) that a lot of people get upset over things that based on Torah rule they do not have right to, and their feelings of upset and pain is stupidity and vain. And only in a case that “chazal” said he has a right to taromet does he have the right to be upset and demand an apology.
69
For both of these examples see for instance; Shita Mekubetzet on Bava Metzia 52b, para. taromet leman.
70
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.79a.4?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
71
See for instance Siach Avraham, Bava Metzia p. 293.
72
See for instance Mishptei Yitzchak, Schirut p. 70. Also quotes a Ketzot that if the reneging was with good reason, that too alleviates any cause for complaints. [In addition see; Daat Mishpat, Choshen Mishpat 333:1, 3, that there may be an argument between the Ketzot and the Sme regarding one who reneges with a valid and legitimate reason, whether he is subject to taromet. And see; Chalat Dvash, Choshen Mishpat Vol. 1, p. 99a.]
73
See for instance; Siftei Kohen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 333:1.
74
See Shach, Choshen Mishpat 333:1 that it comes down to levels of inconvenience. Many of the disputes regarding this could circulate around that, including the distinction of the boat and house. Similarly, the Shach quotes the Nimukei Yosef who believed that when the owner reneges, the workers (if they can find another job) do not have the right to taromet as opposed to the owner, who has right to taromet when the workers renege. And the other “rishonim” argue, thinking that if it is hard and/or inconvenient for the workers to find a new job, they too have a right to complain. Regarding the opinion that the complaint only applies to workers since it is considered an inconvenience as it is uncustomary for an employer to search for new workers, as opposed to workers who are accustomed to it. This argument too can be narrowed down to inconvenience. There are many disputes regarding the exact details of when is someone entitled to complain, if he finds a replacement – if he doesn’t, if the owner finds it hard to replace him… see regarding this for Melo Haroim Vol. 1 letter shin, schirut poalim (in specific 3).
In addition there are opinions (see for instance Hayashar Vehatov 3, p. 247) that employees (and possibly rabbis {see Migdal Hashen 81, p. 65b {quoted in the above mentioned Hayashar Vehatov}, however, it is possible that he would acknowledge that there is taromet, and only thought mechusar amana does not apply. and see the other sources he brings, and in the respunsom of Kiryat Chana he suggests {and rejects} the possibility of reneging on a agreement regarding a job for God, like being a rabbi or cantor is forbidden since he is God’s messenger, as opposed to a regular agreement where it is not forbidden}) do not constitute an act of bad faith when backtracking, even though we have mentioned above that some say a complaint is predicated on the act being constituted as an act of bad faith, not necessarily does that mean over here it does constitute that. In addition it is possible that these opinions do not accept that premise, and believe one is subject to complaint even while the backtraction not constituting an act of bad faith.
It is worth noting that the right to complain regarding having to deal with another person might only apply in certain cases, like if the person already got accustomed to someone, like living with someone on the boat and having to change him for someone else, see the Shach, in addition see Kuntres Taamei Moshe (schirut poealim, 3) that understands the Ramban to say, when workers accept a job (and vice versa) there is no right to complain for backing out, if however they “walked” or started the job in any way, it is legitimate to complain for having to deal with someone new. In addition see Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 311:6, and Sme (there).
In addition an interesting topic is whether one has the right to complaint about an act that was just, we mentioned earlier that there are sources that would argue that even in such a case there can be a valid taromet (like; Siach Avraham, Bava Metzia p. 293.), however we also brought the Ketzot who believed not so. And see Maharsha, Mahadura Batra, Bava Metzia 79a. And we mentioned in an earlier footnote that in Daat Mishpat, Choshen Mishpat 333:1, 3, it understands a possible machloket regarding this between the Ketzot and the Meirat Enayim. And see regarding this; Chalat Dvash, Choshen Mishpat Vol. 1, p. 99a.
75
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.76a?lang=bi
76
See; Kedosh Yisrael (Dessler) Vol. 1, p. 70.
77
He believed taromet if not expressed accordingly is like theft (if he forgave him and still had grievance).
78
And see Chatam Sofer, Bava Metzia 76a.
79
This is a very common understanding however see for example, Rabbi Salanter; Netivot Or (in the book Or Yisrael) p. 210. (And see the above mentioned Reshimot Shiurim, Yevamot, footnote 204, that regarding being upset about something that doesn’t warrant a taromet, Rav Soloveitchik would refer to as stupidity and vain.)
80
This too has many sources, however see for instance; Salmas Chaim, lashon hara, 59. And see Tvunot א-01 p. 680, that taromet is a suit for appeasement, and lashon hara is allowed as a method to ensure it.
81
See Shut Maharshag Vol. 2, 53; that indeed may be the significance of taromet, the right to take revenge otherwise it would be a sin. In addition there are many more rabbis discussing the point in the article, see for instance; Ben Adam Lechavero (Lo Tikom v’Lo Titor) sugya 10, 3 that he brings more, and see Hamaor journal, year 66, 3 (451) p. 99-100.
82
See; Darkei Choshen, Vol. 1, taromet.
83
Salmas Chaim, aveda 61 (in the old print Choshen Mishpat, 789) in the question, he does however conclude not so. As a matter of fact the answers begins as “chalila”. However, see Shut Harashba Vol. 1, 653 that taromet (though one can argue it is a different taromet) is included in “sheerit yisrael lo yaasu avla”, and in addition many of the above mentioned rabbis believe it is mechusar amana, and the verse applies, and see the earlier footnote, regarding cursing for mechusar amana. And see; Rabbi Avraham Burgil, Lechem Abirim, Bava Metzia chapter 4, end of 23a (Lechem Abirim’s pages).
84
See; Shut Bnei Banim Vol. 2, 50.
85
See; Hamaor journal, year 66, 3 (451) p. 100.
86
In Bishvilei Hamishpat (Vol. 4, p. 184) the Chochmat Manoach is quotes to have said that “it is a mitzvah for him to appease him”, since one should make an effort for people to like him, for when someone has enemies down (in this world) he has “mekatregim” (prosecutors) from above, as he who is loved by people is loved by God… and this is the “taam” (meaning) in every place that the rabbis said “yesh lo alav taaromet”. I recently saw it in the Tur “Machon Hamaor” on Choshen Mishpat 310 (in the commentaries in the back), he also mentions there that it (taromet) serves as a permission to the prohibition against hating your friend (“lo tisna et achicha”).
87
See; Netivot Or (in the book Or Yisrael) p. 210. I saw that Refael Reuvain Grozovsky (sefer zichron: Even Tzion p. 542) that he claims; there are laws that apply to a person’s emotions, he referred to these as “chovot halevavot”. And there are some thoughts/emotions that create a “chalot”, the thought has an effect of making something kosher or not, and he brings Taromet as an example that forgiving it although he might have not meant it, being and it is like a financial forgiving (of a suit) “dvarim shebalev enam dvarim”. However, laws that pertain to the heart like loving others, doing teshuva and more, what matters is only that which is in his thought and heart.
And see Dvir Kodsho, moadim Vol. 1, p. 118, in the name of Rav Elyashiv that he only has the right to sue his appeasement until yom kippur, and then he should forgive it.
88
In addition it may be a permission not to forgive, see for instance; Ben Adam Lechavero (Lo Tikom v’Lo Titor) sugya 10, 3.
89
Mitzvat Hamussar (taromet). In addition see Sefer Hatashbetz Vol. 4 (Chut Hameshulash 1) 45, regarding two people that borrowed money (from a non jew) with interest, and one of them handed over his half to the other, and at when it came time to pay back, the person that used the money didn’t want to pay his friends interest rate, claiming it is forbidden as it is like paying him interest for lending him his half (being and his friend is jewish, it is forbidden, as lending with interest if forbidden between jews). The Tashbatz writes that while he is right, if he planned to do this, his friend has a “taromet dvarim” (verbal taromet) to God (i would imagine this refers to complain to God) he also refers to his deceit and exploitation of his friends kindness as swindlerly, and concludes that he should give his friend as a gift the amount of the interest.
90
See the following, and see Kaf HaChayim on Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 606:7.
91
End of the third gate, 231.
92
https://www.sefaria.org/Proverbs.18.8?lang=bi
93
See the commentaries of the Tanach on the verse, for instance; Ralbag.
94
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.52a?lang=bi
95
However see Shut Bnei Banim (Vol. 2, 50) that this is referring to saying the truth (negative things).
96
Shut Kad Hakemach (Eybeschutz), 15.
97
See there he also explains that when someone has animosity towards someone it is often inevitable that he would talk about him, although it is wrong to do so.
98
https://www.sefaria.org/Tractate_Derekh_Eretz_Zuta.1.15?vhe=Talmud_Bavli,_Vilna_1883_ed.&lang=bi&with=Topics&lang2=en
99
https://www.sefaria.org/Tractate_Kallah_Rabbati.5.1?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
100
See for instance; Meorot Torat Hamishpat, Vol. 3, p. 152.
101
See for instance; Teshuvot Maharam Vachaveirav 461 (Moshe Azaria Hadarshan), that every “yarei et dvar hashem” should distance himself from taromet, and others should not have taromet against him. And see the above mentioned Chochmat Manoach (quoted in the back of the Tur {Hamaor} on siman 310).
102
Behaalotcha.
103
And see the above mentioned Chochmat Manoach (quoted in the back of the Tur {Hamaor} to siman 310).
104
https://www.sefaria.org/Yoma.87a.17?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
105
Moed 2, Yoma 87b.
106
See Orchot Chaim, Beer Mayim Chaim (Goldberg), 262.
107
As mentioned in a previous footnote, in Devir Kodsho he says in the name of Rav Elyashiv that the right of taromet is only until yom kippur and then he needs to forgive him.
108
Bava Metzia, end of 76b.
109
In the english translation it says “the owner may have no more than complaints against him.”
110
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%2C_Hiring.8?ven=Mishneh_Torah,_trans._by_Eliyahu_Touger._Jerusalem,_Moznaim_Pub._c1986-c2007&lang=bi
111
Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 326:2, in addition see the Prisha (Choshen Mishpat 326).
112
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=9119&st=&pgnum=114&hilite=
113
Similarly there is a discussion regarding enforcing taromet, and/or mechusar amana regarding poor people and pious people or scholars, see for instance; Shaarei Shlomo, Choshen Mishpat Vol. 2, 69:2.
114
See for instance; Daat Mishpat, schirut poalim, p. 116, and see Shamru Mishpat, hilchot deot, 6 (and it would seem so from rabbi Yisrael Salanter in Netivot Or {the one mentioned above}).

Olvass!

1. Talmudi Fogalmak

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Taromet

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Olvass!

Táromet

Mákin Veonsin Selo Min Hádin

Gólem Gyilkolás

Diné Sámájim

Mi Seporá Midor Hámábul

Kinjánim