בס”ד

He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the generation of the dispersion, i.e., that of the Tower of Babel, will in the future exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement.
– Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:2¹

Mi shepara midor hamabul – מי שפרע מדור המבול

In the Talmud:

When acquiring an object, there are two possible acts of acquisition (kinyanim) for the buyer: 1) paying for the object and 2) physically taking possession of it. The question arises: what actually makes the object the buyer’s property—his payment, or his “pulling” (physical acquisition)?

Rabbi Yochanan believed that on a biblical level, once the payment is made, the object belongs to the buyer. However, the rabbis ruled that the transaction is not complete until the buyer physically takes possession of the item. The reason for this rabbinic enactment was to prevent scams: sellers might sell wheat they didn’t actually have, and after receiving payment, they could claim the wheat was destroyed, saying, “Your wheat was burned in the upper story.”²

According to this rabbinic law, even though the buyer has paid for the item and it is his on a biblical level, the rabbis prevent the transaction from being final until the buyer has taken possession. This enables the seller to reconsider the sale. If he backs out after the customer paid, even though the retraction takes effect, there is a specific curse that applies to the seller.

How so? If the buyer pulled produce from the seller, but the buyer did not yet give the seller their value in money, he cannot renege on the transaction, but if the buyer gave the seller money but did not yet pull produce from him, he can renege on the transaction, as the transaction is not yet complete. But with regard to the latter case, the Sages said: He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the generation of the dispersion, i.e., that of the Tower of Babel, will in the future exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement.
– Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:2³

This curse, known as “Mi Shepara,” has become an iconic phrase. It appears in various forms with slight variations. For instance, in addition to “He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood” would add “and the people of Sodom and Gomorrah” and “the Egyptians who drowned in the sea” and the like.⁴ Also various variations exist as to the ending of the phrase, such as, “He will (or He shall) exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement,” or “He will exact payment from you if you do not stand by your word.” It can even specify the person’s name: “He will exact payment from so-and-so.”⁵

If the seller (or buyer) wishes to back out of a transaction after payment has been made, he must accept this curse in court.⁶ There is a dispute in the Talmud (Bava Metzia 48b) whether the bet din (the court) actively curses the individual (wishing upon them the fate of those from the generations of the flood and the dispersion) or merely informs them that such a fate will befall them:

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute. Abaye said that we inform one who seeks to renege on a transaction: Be aware that this is the punishment of one who does not stand by his statement. Rava said that we curse him with that statement.⁷

There are halachic consequences to accepting the curse. For example, if the seller wishes to return the money, he is “responsible” for the money. Therefore, if it is stolen, he must repay it. However, once he has accepted the curse, he is no longer “responsible,” and if the money is lost, he is not required to repay it.⁸

The ownership status of the object prior to accepting the curse is not entirely clear, as it is uncertain to what extent it belongs to the buyer and/or the seller. For instance, Divrei Geonim (63:14) cites differing opinions regarding a seller who changes his mind and dies before accepting the curse. There is debate over whether the item must be given to the seller’s heirs or if it should be transferred to the buyer.

In other words, prior to accepting the curse, the contractual obligations and concomitant responsibilities can be viewed as settled, meaning the item must be given to the buyer. However, having accepted the curse his right to retain the object is reinstated and he is no longer required to hand it over to the buyer.

Alternatively, the item can be seen as entirely in the seller’s possession, and he is not obligated to transfer it even without taking the curse. However, if he decides to renege and not give it to the buyer, he must accept the curse.

Similarly, the curse cannot be “inherited.” For example, if a father sells something and dies before the buyer “pulls” the item, the child can back out of the deal without accepting the curse.⁹ Likewise, a guardian acting on behalf of an orphan can reconsider without being obligated to accept the curse.¹⁰

The curse is “kinyan” dependent

One is only required to accept the curse if payment has been made. However, if only an agreement was reached without any payment, although backing out is forbidden, the curse does not apply. Furthermore, the curse is only applied in specific contexts. For instance, if the sold item does not yet exist (such as future produce from a tree), the curse is generally not applicable because the item cannot be acquired through a “kinyan.”¹¹

Similarly, if no form of a kinyan has been executed (e.g., in the case of a gift or agreement), the curse does not apply.¹²

There are limits to the obligation of accepting the curse. For example, if the purchased item is lost, there is no need to accept the curse. Some opinions even suggest that the curse is not obligatory if one backs out of the transaction out of fear that the item might be lost.¹³

Mechusar Amana

If the buyer has not made any payment but has agreed on the item, there is a Talmudic debate (Bava Metzia 49a) about whether this constitutes “mechusar amanah” (acting in bad faith).

It was stated: There is an amoraic dispute with regard to reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition. Rav says: It does not constitute an act of bad faith. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It constitutes an act of bad faith.¹⁴

In halacha, it is considered forbidden and is viewed as an act of bad faith (“mechusar amanah”).¹⁵

The Mishnah (Sheviit 10:9) states:

All movable property can be acquired [only] by the act of drawing, but whoever fulfills his word, the sages are well pleased with him.¹⁶

The Talmud (Bava Metzia 48a) expounds on this:

And Rava says: With regard to one who reneges on his commitment, we have only the statement that the Sages are displeased with him, but not that he is subject to a curse. The Gemara explains: If there is a statement of commitment and there is the payment of money accompanying it, he stands subject to the curse… If there is a statement of commitment and there is no payment of money accompanying it, he does not stand subject to the curse…¹⁷

If something changes significantly (e.g., its value), there is much debate about whether one must keep his word. Similarly, it is forbidden to renege on a promise regarding a gift. However, if the gift is substantial, there is a greater chance that the giver might reconsider. In such cases, the recipient would not have anticipated the gift, and it may not be forbidden for the giver to change his mind.¹⁸

For this prohibition, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 49a) cites a verse with an alternate interpretation. The verse (Leviticus 19:36) about honesty in court says, “You shall have an honest balance, honest weights, an honest ephah, and an honest hin.”¹⁹ The Torah says “hin tzedek,” which means “an honest hin,” referring to a measurement of a hin. However, the Talmud offers an alternate interpretation of this phrase:

The Gemara raises an objection: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: “A just ephah, and a just hin, shall you have” (Leviticus 19:36)? But wasn’t a hin included in an ephah? Why is it necessary to state both? Rather, this is an allusion that serves to say to you that your yes [hen] should be just, and your no should be just. Apparently, it is a mitzva for one to fulfill his promises.²⁰

Since the word “hin” can also mean “yes,” the Talmud understands the verse to teach us that one should have a just and honest “yes.” This implies that one should not go back on his word. However, it can also be understood to mean that one should not lie when saying yes:

Abaye says: That verse means that one should not say one matter with his mouth and think one other matter in his heart. It is prohibited for one to make a commitment that he has no intention of fulfilling.

While the Talmud cannot conclusively prove from this verse that it is forbidden to renege on an agreement, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who believes it is forbidden, may indeed deduce it from this verse. In fact, the Mordechai²¹ writes that one who reneges commits a Biblical sin based it on this.

However, most rabbis find a different source for this prohibition.²² The verse in Zephaniah (3:13) states: “The remnant of Israel shall do no wrong and speak no falsehood;”²³ The Talmud also uses this verse in the context of Jews keeping and being required to keep their word.²⁴

This has several halachic implications. For example, it may be permissible to curse someone for reneging on his word.²⁵ Similarly, several rabbis hold that such a person is classified as a “rasha” (wicked man), and it is permissible to call him that.²⁶ Some authorities even state that someone who reneges on his word cannot be trusted regarding certain matters.²⁷

Even the concept of mechusar amana (a person who acts in bad faith) has its limits. Not every instance of reneging can be classified as such. If someone backtracks from an agreement prior to having made a kinyan (a formal act of acquisition), he has acted in bad faith. However, if the agreement pertains to something for which a kinyan could not have been made in the first place, reneging may not constitute an act of bad faith.

For instance, if someone reneges on an agreement concerning something that does not yet exist, since such an object cannot be bought, sold, or legally handed over, reneging on it does not constitute an act of bad faith. Similarly, a kinyan does not transfer ownership of something that does not exist in a tangible way, such as the right to eat fruit from a tree or the right to sleep in a house²⁸. Ownership can only be transferred via a kinyan if the subject of the transfer is an actual, existing object, like the tree or the house itself. Since one cannot transfer such rights with a legally binding kinyan, if someone reneges on giving them over, he may not be considered a mechusar amana.²⁹

Even if the curse does not apply for whatever reason, the prohibition of mechusar amana still stands, and reneging is still prohibited. If the requirement for accepting the curse is uncertain, the defendant (the one reneging) does not need to accept it upon himself.³⁰

Chayav la’amod b’diburo

The responsibility to fulfill one’s agreements is referred to as “chayav la’amod b’diburo,” meaning “obligated to stand by his words.”³¹ This is an interesting concept in financial law.

Kam lei bid’rabah minei

In Jewish law, when someone commits an action that results in two punishable offenses, they are only subjected to the greater punishment and are not penalized for the lesser offense. This principle is known as “kam lei bid’rabah minei,” meaning the person receives the greater of the two punishments³².

For instance, if someone commits a crime that warrants capital punishment, the court does not also impose a financial penalty (if his action also involves a financially punishable crime).

However, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 91a) discusses scenarios where a lesser crime can still have legal consequences, suggesting that the individual might still be responsible for certain aspects of the lesser offense. Rava illustrates this with the following example:

The Torah prohibits one from bringing as an offering an animal given as the payment to a prostitute for services rendered (Deuteronomy 23:19); and this prohibition applies even if the man in question engaged in intercourse with his own mother, which is a capital offence.³³

Rava argues that the consequences of one’s actions remain relevant even when a more severe punishment is involved. To consider the animal prohibited as a sacrifice, it must be given as payment. If it were given as a gift, it would not be prohibited. This implies that while the court does not enforce the payment, the individual is still obligated to fulfill it, making the act of giving it a payment rather than a gift.

The Ran³⁴ (in the name of Rabbeinu David) differentiates between a typical case of “kam lei bid’rabah minei” and Rava’s example. For instance, if someone enters another person’s property to steal, Rav presents an interesting view that, since the homeowner can kill the intruder, the potential death penalty is considered the “greater punishment.” Therefore, the thief is exempt from returning the stolen item:

Rav says: If a burglar broke into a house and took certain vessels, and he then left and was caught only afterward, he is exempt from the obligation to pay restitution for the vessels. What is the reason? He acquired the vessels with his blood. When he broke into the house, he risked his life, as the owner could have killed him. This grave risk that he took exempts him from any other more lenient punishments that could otherwise have been imposed upon him, including the obligation to pay restitution.³⁵

According to the Ran (in the name of Rabbeinu David), in this case, the thief has no obligation to return the stolen items because the threat of being killed by the homeowner negates the financial obligation. However, in Rava’s example, where someone agreed to give an animal as payment for services rendered (even though the act may warrant capital punishment), the individual “needs to stand by his word”.

We can revisit an earlier point. If he gives the animal to his mother and is not obligated to do so, what distinguishes this act as a payment rather than a kindhearted gift or appeasement? Based on the Ran’s interpretation (in the name of Rabbeinu David) we can argue that his responsibility to uphold his word can render the transaction a payment rather than a mere gift.³⁶

It’s regulation:

A major issue exists as to whether or not one can be compelled (in court) to follow through on their commitment and if so by what means.

Regarding enforcement, some argue that the individual can be publicly shamed, others suggest that they can be called a “rasha” (wicked person) or an “avaryan” (transgressor). Some even believe that in principle physical force could be used.³⁷ As previously mentioned, several opinions hold that it is permissible to curse someone in this situation.

There is a distinction between the requirement of paying in a case of “mi shepara” and “mechusar amana.” The former is only applied when there has been a kinyan, whether through money or physical action, but for some reason the acquisition is not completed (either because the rabbis annulled it or because it was done in sin³⁸). In the latter case, however, there is no act of kinyan to require the payment. Nevertheless, in both cases there is an obligation, although it cannot be enforced in court. (See our discussion on dinei shamayim, the laws of heaven).

Chayav b’dinei shamayim

In certain cases where payment cannot be enforced by the court, there remains a moral and ethical obligation to pay:

In the framework of the laws of damages, in a number of cases in which the strict letter of the law does not allow the court to impose payment on the damager, it has been stated that the tortfeasor incurs divine punishment… The Babylonian Talmud (ibid.) enumerates other cases in which the damager is “exempt by human law but liable by divine law”…
As far as the meaning of this incurrence within divine law, the posekim determined that a bet din has to inform the guilty party that, while the court cannot, in fact, sentence him to pay, he still incurs an obligation vis-à-vis divine law (Rabbi Shlomo Luria, Yam Shel Shlomo, bk 6:6). Some held that he is disqualified from bearing witness until he pays, because he is holding stolen money in his possession (Me’iri, Sofer Edition, bk 56a).³⁹

Crimes receive punishment, but it is not the punishment that makes the act a crime. When someone owes money, the debt exists independently of the legal right to sue. For example, even without proof of a debt, the debt is real, and the debtor is obligated to pay it, though it cannot be legally enforced. These ethical laws have nuances and ramifications, making it worth expounding on their relationship to our topic.

Where a lesser penalty, such as a fine, is merged in the larger penalty for the same offense and will not therefore be recoverable, it is sometimes held that in order to satisfy divine law (Dinei Shamayim) as well as human law and not be liable to future divine retribution, one should pay also the lesser penalty, especially where it is payable to the victim (cf. bm 91a; Tos. to bk 70b–7 la; Tos. to Ḥul. 130b).⁴⁰

Rashi, commenting on Rava’s statement, says that the court cannot compel the payment, because the heavier punishment takes precedence. However, the individual has not fulfilled his heavenly obligations as long as he has not paid.

The concept of mi shepara is used in contexts where even a heavenly obligation does not apply. Additionally, the Maharam Mintz⁴¹ argued that if one can curse someone for violating a sin that falls under mi shepara, it is even more justified to curse someone for violating an obligation for which they are liable in the divine court.

When someone is “liable by divine law,” he is obligated to pay because he has caused damage to another, though the court may not enforce this payment due to technicalities (e.g., the court dismissed the charge due to a heavier one, the damage was indirect, etc.). Mi shepara differs in that although the court administers a curse, there is no genuine obligation to make the payment. Therefore, legally, the individual is exempt and only needs to accept the curse. If reneging does not constitute an offense to which they are liable in the heavenly court, it does not carry the same legal weight. This distinction has significant halachic ramifications.⁴²

However, the moral obligation to not renege (mi shepara and mechusar amana) have numerous halachic ramifications irrespective of the heavenly court.

For example, a worker is required to finish his work on time,⁴³ and a mohel (ritual circumciser) may not renege on their commitment.⁴⁴ Rabbi Moshe Feinstein wrote⁴⁵ that if a group of people agrees to collectively go on strike, it is forbidden for an individual to then renege on that agreement.

What is the connection between the flood and reneging?

There are several explanations as to why someone who reneges (after payment has been made) is compared to the Egyptians and those who perished in the flood.

The Me’irat Einayim (204:8) explains that these punishments were chosen as examples because they were public and well-known. Others offer different interpretations,⁴⁶ some even provide mystical explanations.⁴⁷

In this article, I would like to shed light on one of the classic explanations:

Permissible immoral behavior

I find it interesting that the obligation not to renege (and to accept the curse) is tied to the person’s intention.⁴⁸ As mentioned, a curse cannot be inherited. The Ritva wrote that the curse does not apply to children.⁴⁹ Similarly, some have written⁵⁰ that if someone makes a promise to a child and then backs out, it does not constitute mechusar amana.⁵¹

It is also noteworthy that, while there is absolutely no obligation to make the payment even in the eyes of the heavenly court, one can choose not to follow through on a deal (on the condition that they accept the curse). Yet, in doing so, one is still deserving of the strictest and most severe punishments.

There will always be gaps in the law. If someone “legally” steals or “lawfully” causes harm, they have found a way around the regulations without technically breaking any rules. When someone is chayav b’dinei shamayim, they have indeed broken the law. They may not face punitive measures due to enforcement policies or technicalities, but they have still committed a crime. However, when someone acts immorally within the letter of the law, their behavior is beyond any form of legal regulation, leaving the victim with no recourse.

The people of the generation of the deluge devised a nefarious scheme of avoiding to become guilty of having misappropriated at one time more than the worth of a prutah. When someone brought a basket full of fruit to market offering to sell it, he would be mobbed by people each of whom helped himself to less than the value of that coin. By using this subterfuge, the party helping himself to fruit without paying for it, escaped being cited before a judge, who did not entertain claims below that amount.⁵²

Similarly:

Furthermore, they declared in Sodom: Let one who crosses on a ferry give one dinar as payment; let one who does not cross on a ferry, but walks in the river, give two dinars. In addition, when there was anyone who had a row of bricks, each and every one of the people of Sodom would come and take one brick and say to him: I am taking only one, and you are certainly not particular about so inconsequential an item, and they would do this until none remained. And when there was anyone who would cast garlic or onions to dry, each and every one of the people of Sodom would come and take one and say to him: I took only one garlic or onion, and they would do this until none remained.⁵³

We see that the people of Sodom,⁵⁴ like those who perished in the flood,⁵⁵ engaged in theft, but always in such a way that the value of the stolen items was too insignificant to technically qualify as theft. Similarly, the Egyptians promised to free the Israelites and then reneged. Although their actions were not explicitly forbidden, such behavior is undoubtedly and obviously immoral.

The Rambam wrote:⁵⁶

Our Sages declare it wherever opportunity is given, that the idea of God necessarily implies justice; that He will reward the most pious for all their pure and upright actions, although no direct commandment was given them through a prophet; and that He will punish all the evil deeds of men, although they have not been prohibited by a prophet, if common sense warns against them.⁵⁷

The Avnei Nezer, in the end of a responsum (Choshen Mishpat 32) says that it is irrelevant whether the halacha would rule a certain way (referring to a specific instance), since if logical ethics would compel him to act in a certain way, he should act that way and not do that which he desires. He followed this up with a nice explanation pertaining to our topic, in the name of the Chidushei Harim.

Regarding the punishment of the flood the Chizkuni (Genesis 7:21) writes:

If you were to ask why the human race was punished when it had not been given commandments by G-d that had to be observed, we must answer that there are a number of rules for behaviour of society that mankind can be expected to honour without the need to be specifically commanded to do so. If proof were needed for this statement we remind you of Kayin being punished for having killed his brother Hevel, although there is no record that he was ever warned by G-d not to kill another human being.⁵⁸

Based on this, the Chidushei Harim argued that although reneging on a sale after payment is not specifically prohibited, it is implicitly understood to be wrong. It is forbidden not on the grounds of a specific commandment but rather on logical and natural law. This is why the curse compares it to the punishment administered to the people of the flood.

Similarly, in Siach Sarfei Kodesh,⁵⁹ the Chidushei Harim is quoted as saying that although stealing less than a “perutah” does not legally constitute theft, it is nonetheless “inhumane.” This is why reneging is compared to such an act—because, although it is technically permissible, it is not “menschlich” (in keeping with proper human conduct).

It can be compared⁶⁰ to what his (the Chidushei Harim’s) grandson wrote in Sfat Emet. The Sfat Emet explained that the Mishnah likens someone who reneges on a promise to those who perished in the flood because “derech eretz kadma laTorah,” meaning that “ethics and morality precede even the Torah.”⁶¹

Regarding mechusar amana:

One must stay far from falsehood. There are many opinions on lying, particularly whether it is prohibited⁶² since the Torah (Exodus 23:7) states: “From a false matter, you are to keep far!”⁶³ Similarly, a “yerei shamayim” (a God-fearing person) not only avoids speaking falsehood but also, in a case where someone misunderstands a situation and as a result is willing to pay more, a “yerei shamayim” will inform that person of the misunderstanding and not capitalize on their lack of clarity.⁶⁴ This principle also originates from a verse (Psalms 15:1-2): “LORD, who shall sojourn in Thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell upon Thy holy mountain? He that walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness, And speaketh truth in his heart.”⁶⁵ Orchot Tzadikim writes⁶⁶ that a person should remain truthful even in their dreams and should not dream falsehoods.

However, mechusar amana is different. The obligation to keep one’s word is not merely an ethical issue distancing one from falsehood, it is also and primarily problematic in that it causes harm and loss to others.⁶⁷

The Birkat Avraham explains that, according to Rashi’s opinion,⁶⁸ the prohibition against reneging does not need to be explicitly stated, as it is obvious that one should act that way

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

1
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia.4.2?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
2
See for instance: Bava Metzia 47b.
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.47b.6?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
3
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia.4.2?lang=bi
4
For examples as to alternative forms of the curse to the way it is found in the Mishnah, see; Bava Metzia 48a, similarly Rif, Bava Metzia 28b, and Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 204:4. And see; Bava Metzia 47b and Tosefta Bava Metzia 3:7, that it only mentioned the flood. A curse of “mi shepara” (He who cursed…), can be found in other places too, see for instance; Midrash Tanchumah, Bo 4, and Psikta Rabati 17.
5
See for instance Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 204:4. And see Shut Maharam Mintz 101 that the person’s name is mentioned in the curse “hu yifra miploni zeh…” (he will exact payment from this “ploni” {ploni is a term, that is used to refer to someone hypothetical without specifying a name, like xyz or so-and-so}).
6
Sulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 204(:4).
7
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.48b.2?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
8
See for instance; Bava Metzia from 49a, and Sulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 198:15.
See, Netivot HaMishpat, Hidushim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 198:23, that if he did not offer to give the money back, he is “responsible”.
9
See for instance; Divrei Geonim klal 63, 13 (and see 14).
10
See for instance; Sefer Hachinuch 65:5 regarding this case, that a child does not need to accept a curse. And see; Divrei Geonim (in the previous footnote).
11
Regarding this see for instance Ketzot Hachoshen 209:9. However there are those that do not agree with this (see there).
12
See for instance Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 204:6-7, in addition see Sefer Nir, end of tractate Shviit: that with a gift Mi Shepara does not apply, only where there is a kinyan (with money).
13
See; Sulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpst 204:2.
14
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.49a.5?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
15
See; Sulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 204:7.
16
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Sheviit.10.9?lang=bi
17
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.48a.3?lang=bi
18
See for instance; Sulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 204:8. Regarding if things change, see Shut Shevet Halevi Vol. 7, 236:7, based on the Ketzot HaChoshen (333:1) that if there is a really good reason (like not needing the service, the ketzot distinguishes between no “taana” to a “taana raba”, in which case one may renege) to renege, everyone would agree that it is permissible.
19
https://www.sefaria.org/Leviticus.19.36?vhe=Tanach_with_Ta%27amei_Hamikra&lang=bi&aliyot=0
20
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.49a.6?lang=bi
21
Bava Metzia at the end, 451, tshuva. And see; Meiri, Bava Metzia 48a.
22
As mentioned above there are those who believe reneging is a biblical violation, however there are those who believe that it merely violates a rabbinic law, and others may not even believe it violates that much. See for instance; Zichron Binyamin Zeev Vol. 5, Choshen Mishpat 204:7, (p. 281), and the Sede Chemeds he quotes.
23
https://www.sefaria.org/Zephaniah.3.13?vhe=Tanach_with_Ta%27amei_Hamikra&lang=bi
24
See for instance; Kidushin 45b, Psachim 91a, and Bava Metzia 106b.
25
It is forbidden to curse: “a fit Jew who acts as a member of your people, i.e., in accordance with Torah law,” one that does not act in such a manner it is permissible to curse. Since the above mentioned verse says: “The remnant of Israel shall do no wrong and speak no falsehood,” if someone violates it he no longer is acting in the way of “your people”, and it should be permissible to curse him. There are opinions that hold that mechusar amana is also in violation of this verse, perhaps they believe one is allowed to curse such a person too. See for instance; Shut Maharam Mintz 101; that he tells a story of someone that wanted to renege, and the rabbi asked the cantor (the one that leads the prayers – shliach tzibur) to announce to everyone about his reneging, and that what he is doing is in violation of… He also accounts a similar story with himself. He also writes that the Rif thought that he (who reneges) is not considered a member of “your people”. And see; Nimukei Yosef, Bava Metzia 29a dibur hamatchil itmar (and the one before it, beose). And see Tshuvot Vehanhagot (Sternbuch) Vol. 5, 374.
Rabbi Yosef Engel (Gilyonei Hashas, Bava Metzia 48b) quotes sources where we find it in the opposite way; it is written (Yalkut Shimoni, remez 919:4) that we should listen to a profit that does not act like the other nations, similarly in the Talmud (Avoda Zara 10b) is discussing that the descendants of Esau also get “the world to come”, only those don’t, who act like Esau.
26
See for instance the above mentioned Maharam Mintz (Shut 101), in the name of the Maharam, and see Yoreh Deah 264 Beit Yosef 6, Taz 5, Shach 7, in the name of the “ram” (Maharam). And see; Mishpat Shalom siman 204 on seif 11, that the court should prevent this, and call him an “avaryan”. It is however important to note that not everyone agrees with this, see for instance; Shita Mekubetzet, Bava Metziá 49a dibur hamatchil od.
27
See Nimukei Yosef, Bava Metzia 29a dibur hamatchil itmar (and Shut Betzel haChochma, Vol. 5, 159:1).
28
See: Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 212:1.
29
See; Shut Harosh klal 102, 10. However see Shut Maharam Schick, Yoreh Deah 306.
30
See for instance; Mishpat Shalom siman 190 on seif 7, and what he says in the name of the Bach, and see; Shut Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 102 that the defendant can claim “kim lei” (“i.e., the litigant’s reliance on a certain rabbinical opinion in a matter disputed among halakhic authorities, as a means of preventing a monetary ruling against him” – Elon, Menachem, Compromise. Encyclopaedia Judaica).
31
See Tur/Sulchan Arukh and its commentaries, Choshen Mishpat 204.
32
https://www.sefaria.org/Ketubot.33b.13?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
33
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.91a.5?lang=bi
34
Sanhedrin 72a.
35
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.72a.5?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
36
ראה שואל ומשיב (מהדורא רביעאה ג׳, ל״ט) ועוד שדימו זה לזה.
37
See Mishpat Shalom, end of 204.
38
I do not mean to say that in Rava’s case, he has to accept the curse, I only mean to compare their responsibility to pay, having agreed on something and followed through on a kinyan. As a matter of fact, Mi shepara is less than chayav b’dinei shamayim and “tfisa” might not work, unlike Rava’s case, as mentioned in the article and see Mishpat Shalom beginning of 204.
39
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/divine-punishment
40
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/divine-punishment
41
Shut 101.
42
There are many sources for this; see for instance the above mentioned Mishpát Shalom (beginning of 204) that although “tfisa” is effective if the defendant is liable in the heavenly court, it is not effective if he is only required to accept a curse, and Divrei Sofrim klal 63, 4, and see Or Hatzafun, Genesis 20.
43
See for instance; Pninei Halacha, likutim II, 2:9.
44
See for instance; Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 264:6. Similarly see the above mentioned Maharam Mintz (101) in the name of the “Maharam” that once someone promised a mohel that he can circumcise his son, he is not allowed to renege.
45
Igrot Moshe Vol. 4, Choshen Mishpat (Vol. 1) 58, see there that it also depends on other considerations, like whether there is a legitimate reason to renege on the strike.
46
See Shita Mekubetzet, Bava Metzia 48a that the reason for mentioning the egyptians is because because they committed the same sin (regarding the flood he writes similar to the Meiri:), similarly see the Meiri (there) that like others explained that they committed crimes which can not be enforced/punished, or that are not specifically forbidden, similar to reneging. Alternatively see; Chanukat Hatorah 119, and Kli Chemdah, Noach 4.
47
See for instance; Shnei Luchot Habrit, “Torah Shebichtav” Ki Tetzei, Torah Or (harei).
48
See Mishpat Shalom 204 (on seif 11) that perhaps mechusar amana does not apply to a poor person. Similarly in a case of mechusar amana even if the situation significantly changed, one is not allowed to renege from a poor person.
.ועיין בנמק”י בב”מ הנ”ל ד”ה ובמתנה דהביא הך מירושלמי וכ’ דנעשה נדר
49
See for instance; Ritva on Kiddushin 28b. There are a lot more that discuss this see for instance, Daat Mishpat Vol. 2, 634.
50
Rabbi Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld assumed so, see Shut Salmas Chaim, Choshen Mishpat, Shchenim 35. And see; Netiv Yosher, Mekach Umemkar 35:8, and see Mishpatei Chaim Vol. 1, 6:7, and Torat Esh, kinyanim 1, siman 2, from end of p. 150 (and see the Kehilat Yaakov they quote: 119, zechiya lekatan p. 26b). And see; Daat Mishpat mentioned in the previous footnote.
51
See Shut Shoel Umeshiv (mahadura rvia 3:39) that reneging on a sinful deal may not require one to accept the curse.
52
https://www.sefaria.org/Chizkuni%2C_Genesis.6.11.2?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
53
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.109b.2?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=bi
54
See for instance: https://minchasasher.com/he/shiur/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%91%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%92%D7%96%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%A4%D7%97%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%A4-%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%95/
55
See for instance, Meiri Bava Metzia 48a, and see the previous footnote.
56
More Nvuchim Vol. 3, 17.
57
https://www.sefaria.org/Guide_for_the_Perplexed%2C_Part_3.17.9?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
In the Tel Aviv translation it says nature warns against them, however in the Ibn Tibun translation it says the brain warns against them.
58
https://www.sefaria.org/Chizkuni%2C_Genesis.7.21.1?ven=Chizkuni,_translated_and_annotated_by_Eliyahu_Munk&lang=bi
59
536.
60
https://daf-yomi.com/DYItemDetails.aspx?itemId=35151
61
Amongst others, see Hegyonot El Ami, Vol. 2, Noach 2:5, and Or Hatzafun, Genesis 20 that this is how they explain “mi shepara”.
62
See; https://www.hamichlol.org.il/%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A8_%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8#cite_ref-6
63
https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.23.7?vhe=Tanach_with_Ta%27amei_Hamikra&ven=The_Five_Books_of_Moses,_by_Everett_Fox._New_York,_Schocken_Books,_1995&lang=bi&aliyot=0
64
See for instance; Bava Batra 88a, and Rashi there; Makot 24a, and Rashi (there) dibur hamatchil Rav Safra: ““And speaks truth in his heart”; this is referring to one such as Rav Safra, who was reciting Shema when a person approached him to purchase an item. He intended to accept the man’s offer, but he was unable to respond because it is prohibited to interrupt the recitation of Shema. The buyer misinterpreted Rav Safra’s silence and concluded that Rav Safra demanded a higher price, so he raised his offer. Rav Safra insisted on selling him the item for the sum that he was offered initially.”
https://www.sefaria.org/Makkot.24a.6?lang=bi
We see the verse used in this context. And see Sheiltot d’Rav Achai Gaon 36.
65
https://www.sefaria.org/Psalms.15.2?ven=The_Holy_Scriptures:_A_New_Translation_(JPS_1917)&lang=bi
66
Shaar Haemet, dibur hamatchil hamalachim.
67
This (that the prohibition of reneging is not an obligation of distancing oneself from dishonesty, rather a prohibition against causing harm) can have a leniency too, see Birkat Avraham, Bava Metzia 49a.
ועיין במשפט שלום הנ”ל שלמד מגמ’ בבכורות דאינו שייך לגבי נכרי, והרבה כתבו בענין זה.
And see Ben Yehoyada, Bava Metzia 49a.
68
As mentioned above “There is an amoraic dispute with regard to reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition” between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan, according to rashi this dispute applies when something has significantly changed, otherwise everyone would agree that reneging is forbidden and constitutes mechusar amana, and this (the prohibition against reneging when the circumstances haven’t changed) does not require a verse since it is obvious.

Olvass!

1. Talmudi Fogalmak

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Mi Shepara

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Olvass!

Táromet

Mákin Veonsin Selo Min Hádin

Gólem Gyilkolás

Diné Sámájim

Mi Seporá Midor Hámábul

Kinjánim