בס”ד

Svoro De’oraita – סברא דאורייתא

Definition:
A “de’oraita” (scriptural or biblical) obligation or law, that is not explicitly stated in the Torah but can be logically deduced.

In the morning prayers, we say “Leolam Yehei Adam Yirei Shamayim,” which translates as “a person should always be God-fearing”.¹ However, an alternative understanding suggests that one should prioritize being a (decent) person first and foremost, and being god-fearing should only come after being a morally upright individual.²

Some laws and principles are not governed by religious doctrines but by natural law or logical reasoning. Certain prohibitions are so deeply ingrained in fundamental logic, are so intuitively correct and inherent in nature, that even were they not to be explicitly outlined in the Torah, they would still be prohibited. Such activities, though not mentioned in the Torah, can be considered sins on the level of “Deoraita”. Similarly, actions whose fulfillment is obligatory logically or by means of nature can be considered “mitzvot” on the level of “Deoraita.”

Murder is forbidden without the Torah’s prohibition!

In order to punish someone for committing a crime, Jewish law requires that they be warned in advance that the action they are about to commit is forbidden. It would be unjust to punish someone for an action they did not know was forbidden.

Hatra’ah: Caution or warning given to those who are about to commit a crime. The Rabbis consider the fact that not all men are lawyers (comp. “Yad Malaki,” Din 24), and therefore many sin through ignorance or error. To prove guilty intention, which alone can render one amenable to the full penalty for his crime, the Rabbis provide that, prior to the perpetration of a crime, the one who is about to perpetrate it must have been cautioned of…³

Rabbi Yosef Engel proposes the possibility⁴ that a sin which is a “svoro” (logically compelling), may not necessitate prior warning for punishment. In situations where a prohibition is so inherently obvious that the Torah need not explicitly forbid it, and it remains forbidden irrespective of its mention in the Torah, the transgressor may face punishment without prior warning (hatra’a). The individual cannot claim ignorance, as they should have known it was forbidden even without knowledge of its mention in the Torah.⁵

For instance, if someone commits murder without Hatra’ah, there are situations where they might still be liable for punishment, even were they to be ignorant of it being prohibited by the Torah, according to certain Talmudic opinions.⁶

It seems apparent that logic as the basis for prohibiting crimes like murder is not only important but also obvious; it is not a groundbreaking innovation.

The Chizkuni (Genesis 7:21) comments on the people in the flood being punished for sinning despite not having been explicitly warned against it.

If you were to ask why the human race was punished when it had not been given commandments by G-d that had to be observed, we must answer that there are a number of rules for behaviour of society that mankind can be expected to honour without the need to be specifically commanded to do so. If proof were needed for this statement we remind you of Kayin being punished for having killed his brother Hevel, although there is no record that he was ever warned by G-d not to kill another human being.⁷

Logic as a source

It is not uncommon for the Talmud to present a logical argument as the source for an assertion, rule or law. This often occurs within the context of an already existing law, where the logic serves as the source for the specifics and details of the law.

A classic example is the Talmudic ruling that prohibits committing murder even at the expense of one’s own life:⁸

The Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.⁹

The halacha stating that “if one is ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed” is derived from logic. The Torah nevertheless “juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer” to teach us that in that case too “she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.” This would seem to suggest that the Torah accepts logically binding laws to the extent that it teaches other laws by deriving them from these ones.¹⁰

Mitzva that is a svoro

A “mitzvah” (commandment or religious obligation) may occasionally be obligatory due to “svoro” (logical reasoning)

One such example is regarding the obligation to recite a blessing before eating, where the Talmud (Berakhot 35a) asserts that it is a “svoro”:

The fundamental obligation to recite a blessing over food is founded on reason: One is forbidden to derive benefit from this world without a blessing.¹¹

The Pnei Yehoshua comments¹² that the blessing before eating must be “Deoraita,” as it is a logically binding obligation. He provides examples of a “svoro” being binding at the level of “Deoraita.” While some rabbis accept this position, considering the blessing “Deoraita”,¹³ in normative halacha it is regarded as a rabbinic obligation.¹⁴

It is self-evident that not all logic-based obligations are necessarily of the same status. While some may be deemed rabbinic, others might be considered “deoraita.” Various reasons can account for these distinctions, such as how compelling the logic is, differences in the nature of the logic and so on.

Rabbi Yosef Engel explained¹⁵ that despite the fact that there are compelling factors to obligate making a blessing before eating, it nonetheless remains of rabbinic nature. He argued that only “external” logic, which is recognized outside the Jewish religious framework and can be understood by people on humanitarian grounds, can be considered mandatory on the level of “deoraita” without a specific commandment. Laws such as the prohibition against killing or stealing are logical for all people and are equally binding, even if not explicitly stated in the Torah. However, there is logical reasoning that is inherent to the framework of Jewish law, such as the obligation to recite blessings. It is evident to a rabbi that eating without a blessing is improper, but this logical deduction stems from within the religious and rabbinic perspective.

Rabbi Reuvein Margolies believed¹⁶ that logic can only be binding on the level of “deoraita” if it pertains to “bein adam lachaveiro”, which would be literally translated as “between a person and their fellow.” This refers to ethical, moral, or social mitzvot that govern relationships between and among people.¹⁷

However, if the logic were to obligate something pertaining to the relationship “between a person and God”, it would not be binding on the level of “deoraita.”

In the Talmud

There are instances where the Talmud will cite a verse to prove a claim, only to subsequently question the necessity for a scriptural verse when the obligation appears to be logically compelling. For example (Bava Kamma 46b):

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: From where is it derived that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant? As it is stated in the Torah when Moses appointed Aaron and Hur to judge the people: “Whoever has a cause, let him come near [yiggash] to them” (Exodus 24:14). This is interpreted to mean that whoever has a claim against another should submit [yaggish] proof to them. According to this interpretation, this verse demonstrates clearly that the claimant is responsible for supplying the proof.
Rav Ashi objects to this: Why do I need a verse to derive this? It is based on logical reasoning that one who suffers from pain goes to the doctor. Just as here the individual with the problem has the responsibility to resolve it, so too, someone with a claim against another must bring a proof to corroborate his claim.¹⁸

On more than one occasion the Talmud asks, “Why do I need a verse to derive this? It is based on logical reasoning”.¹⁹ Furthermore, there are occasions where the Talmud does not even bring a verse but only mentions a logical argument.²⁰ Additionally, the Talmud sometimes describes something that is derived from a logical argument as “deoraita”.²¹

Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Chajes, in Mevo HaTalmud (Introduction to the Talmud) Chapter 4, and Rabbi Jacob Reischer²² concluded based on the above, that a law that is logically deduced is effectively Biblical.

Regesh Hamusar (sense of ethics)

Rabbi Amiel wrote²³ that the sense of ethics (regesh hamusar) and that of faith (regesh haemunah) “are twins.” He believed it is implicitly necessary for a religious Jew to possess not only a sense of morality rooted in faith but also one based on an external moral compass. Additionally, just as a religious standard based solely on belief may not suffice, he argues that one based solely on logic may also fall short. These two aspects complement each other, and both are required for maintaining an ethical society.

Natural law

The Talmud in Eruvin 100b states:

Similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would nonetheless have learned modesty from the cat, which covers its excrement, and that stealing is objectionable from the ant, which does not take grain from another ant, and forbidden relations from the dove, which is faithful to its partner, and proper relations from the rooster, which first appeases the hen and then mates with it.²⁴

Einstein believed that one could find religious meaning from within nature:

II. Scientific research can reduce superstition by encouraging people to think and view things in terms of cause and effect. Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order.
Ill. This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feeling, in a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, represents my conception of God. In common parlance this may be described as “pantheistic” (Spinoza).²⁵

While Judaism does believe in a conventional God, it also accepts the position that nature can be seen as divine. By analyzing nature, one can derive spiritual realities from it. Judaism might agree with Einstein that we can deduce spiritual truths from nature, as it views nature as inherently spiritual.

Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kasher wrote an interesting article about “svoro deoraita”,²⁶ in which he seeks to explain that we can derive ethical, moral, and other values from nature. Many sources in Midrashim and rabbinic literature assert that nature is Godly, and indeed is a true reflection of the Torah, whereby the world itself was formed and carved out from the Torah. In Bereshit Rabbah 1:1, it is stated: “And the artisan does not build it based on his own knowledge, but rather, he has [plans on] sheets and tablets by which to ascertain how he should build its rooms, how he should build its doors. So too, the Holy One blessed be He looked in the Torah and created the world. The Torah says: “Bereshit God created” (Genesis 1:1), and reshit is nothing other than the Torah.” Similarly, it is said about the rules of the Torah: “‘Statutes [ḥukim]’ with which I set the heavens and the earth,” and similarly that they (Torah and nature) are similar and comparable to each other. Rabbi Kasher argued that this is true also with regards to a person. A person is also “Torahdik” and Godly. We need to recognize and follow natural law, for it is divine, and this should apply to a person as well, to his logic and nature; that is divine too.

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

1
https://www.chabad.org/library/siddur/default_cdo/aid/1495868/jewish/Online-Siddur-with-Commentary.htm#!/aid:2349991/title:%D7%9C%D6%B0%D7%A2%D7%95%D6%B9%D7%9C%D6%B8%D7%9D%20%D7%99%D6%B0%D7%94%D6%B5%D7%90%20%D7%90%D6%B8%D7%93%D6%B8%D7%9D%20-%20Morning%20Prayers
2
See for example http://shlomo-aviner.net/index.php?title=%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%93%D7%9D_%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%91%D7%9F_%D7%90%D7%93%D7%9D and https://www.ivelt.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=31595 in addition see https://asif.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/03-98.pdf p.65.
3
https://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/7330-hatra-ah
4
Beit haOtzar, maarechet alef, klal 131.
5
In Makkot 9b, the Talmud discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yosi (in Mishna Makkot 2:3). According to his view, if someone hates another person who he then killed, it can be presumed that the hater killed him intentionally and therefore liable to punishment. The Talmud explains that in such cases, there is no requirement for prior warning. This is based on the opinion that a “Talmid Chacham”, who is presumed to be knowledgeable about the law, does not need to be warned before being punished. So too, the hater who knew that the action was forbidden does not need to be warned.
Based on this Rabbi Yosef Engel suggested that a law that is logically compelling does not require prior warning to inform the transgressor of its prohibition. While this argument may only be valid according to one Talmudic opinion, the underlying logic is not necessarily disputed by other Talmudic opinions. The argument between them might be due to other considerations; for instance, they may believe that the warning serves additional purposes. It is worth noting that not all rabbis accept this argument, see for example; Kli Chemda, Vayakhel 4.
6
See the footnotes above.
7
https://www.sefaria.org/Chizkuni%2C_Genesis.7.21.1?lang=bi It is however worth noting that the Chizkuni offers a second explanation, suggesting that the people in the flood may have been warned against the particular sin of theft. However, this position by the Chizkuni opens up a broader topic of discussion regarding punishment for sins that individuals should have known without a specific commandment. There are numerous sources that also make this claim, including the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim Vol. 3, 17, and I have seen that a lot of people quote Rabbenu Nissim Gaon that we are obligated to keep some things because of logic from the day He created the world (he means that these rules being kept are a part of nature, it is worth noting that I did not see this for myself). Additionally see https://forum.otzar.org/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3249 In addition, see Torat Menachem, 5747, second day of Shavuot from Ot 27, that non jews are punished for transgressing a prohibition or for not fullfilling an obligation that is solely based on logic, this is also why the people of Sodom and Gomorrah were punished.
8
See for instance, Pesachim 25b, Sanhedrin 74a, Yoma 82b.
9
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.74a.19?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
10
אף דכבר האריכו האחרונים והקדמונים דצריך לזה גם פסוק, מ”מ לענ”ד ראי’ ברורה הוא דהרי בגמ’ הלימוד הוי מסברא אף אי איכא קרא בהדיה, וקרא צריכא במקום דלא שייך הסברא וכמו באמרו להם תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגנו ואם לאו נהרוג כולכם דיהרגו כולם, ובאמת איכא למידק איפכא, דהרי אף דאיכא קרא, רבא ענה לו מסברא והלימוד מרציחה הוי מהסברה “סברא הוא”, וע”כ מוכח דהסברא קודם להפסוק (לכה”פ כאן) דאל”ה הוה ליה למימר הפסוק ויש להאריך בזה עוד, ומ”מ ברור מהגמ’ דסברא מהני לדאורייתא. ומ”מ שו”ר באחרונים דגם באמרו להם תנו לנו אחד מכם הוא ע”פ הסברא דמאי חזית. ומ”מ אין רצוני להאריך בענין זה, ועיין גם בספר החינוך דמשמע דהוי מפאת סברא.
ומ”מ זהו לשונו של הכסף משנה “ואפשר לומר דס”ל לר”ל שמ”ש דבש”ד סברא הוא אינו עיקר הטעם דקבלה היתה בידם דש”ד יהרג ואל יעבור אלא שנתנו טעם מסברא להיכא דשייך אבל אין ה”נ דאפילו היכא דלא שייך האי טעמא הוי דינא הכי דיהרג ואל יעבור”, ואף דלא משמע הכי, אפשר לומר דכוונתו הוא דאין להקל מחמת חסרון הסברא אך לחומרא הוי לא מפאת הקבלה והפסוק אלא מחמת הסברא, וצ”ע דאין לעשות מחלוקת בין ר”י ור”ל ללא צורך. וכמ”כ במ”ש הכלי חמדה ויקהל ד’ דלשי’ רק בעכו”ם אמרי’ ולשי’ מהגמ’ אין ראי’ עיי”ש, אך מ”מ לעניות דעתי שפיר איכא למידק מן הגמרא הנ”ל ודו”ק. ואבקש מקוראי הגליון לכתוב בענין זה.
11
https://www.sefaria.org/Berakhot.35a.18?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
12
Berakhot 35a.
13
For instance; see Sefer Maharil, Hilchot Haggadah (p. 15) that one should be stringent, and repeat the blessing in a case of doubt like in a biblical doubt, this opinion was brought down in Chok Yaakov 474, who did not accept it. In addition see, Gilyonei Hashas, Berakhot 35a, dibur hamatchil sham ela.
14
See for instance Shulchan Arukh HaRav, Orach Chayim 167:12, and Chok Yaakov 474.
15
Beit haOtzar, maarechet alef, klal 131.
16
See; Margaliot HaYam, Sanhedrin 74a.
17
https://reformjudaism.org/glossary/bein-adam-lachaveiro
18
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma.46b.6?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
19
For example, see Ketubot 22a, and Niddah 25a. Similarly see, Chullin 114b, and Pesachim 21b. And see Tosafot Shevuot 22b.
20
See for instance Shabbat 96b. For precedence that a logic can serve as a legitimate source and there is no need for a verse, there are many Talmudic sources, see; Yevamot 13a, 46b, 54b, 88a, Avodah Zarah 52a, Menachot 2b, Kiddushin 13b, Sanhedrin 15a, 28a, 29a, Bekhorot 37b, Shevuot 36a, Bava Batra 48a, 77a, Bava Metzia 81a, Chagigah 11b. A similar phrase in the Talmud, is “If you wish, say that this… is derived from a verse; if you wish, say instead that it is derived via logical reasoning.” see for instance: Bava Batra 8b, Menachot 2a, 73b, Zevachim 2a, Chullin 118b, Avodah Zarah 34b, Kiddushin 35b, Sanhedrin 30a, Shevuot 22b, Yevamot 35b.
21
For example, in Yoma 74a-b: “What is the law with regard to a half-measure? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited by Torah law… The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan said it is prohibited by Torah law because it is fit to combine with another half-measure. If one continues to eat more, he will eat a whole measure, which is punishable by Torah law. Therefore, even when he eats the first half-measure he is eating forbidden food.” In addition see Nimukei Yosef on Bava Metzia 89b (in the pages of the Rif) in the new print 28b, regarding kinyan. similarly see Avnei Nezer, Yoreh Deah 306:17, that a vow made to someone else is binding from a logical basis without need for the Torah to prohibit breaking it, and the verse is only prohibiting such a vow that one made to himself. And see Rabbi Yosef Engel in Beit haOtzar (Ma’arechet Alef Klal 131) in the name of the Chemdat Shlomo, that it is logically prohibited to cause another to sin. And see Shut Shoel Umeshiv vol. 1, 44, regarding copyright.
22
Shut Shevut Yaakov, vol. 3, 135. (p. 74:4).
23
Darkah shel Torah 3. In addition see; Hegyonot El Ami , Volume I, Shabbat Shuvah 29.
24
https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.100b.30?lang=bi
25
See https://namnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/29289146-ideas-and-opinions-by-albert-einstein.pdf p. 262.
26
Mefaneach Tzfunot chapter 6.
27
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%94_%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%99_%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%9D#cite_note-10 and https://yoelamital.com/%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%97%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%94/%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%99-%D7%A0%D7%A2%D7%9D/

Olvass!

1. Talmudi Fogalmak

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Svoro Deoraita

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Olvass!

Táromet

Mákin Veonsin Selo Min Hádin

Gólem Gyilkolás

Diné Sámájim

Mi Seporá Midor Hámábul

Kinjánim