בס”ד

One who repays his debts after the seventh year, the sages are pleased with him. One who borrows from a convert whose sons had converted with him, the debt need not be repaid to his sons, but if he returns it the sages are pleased with him. All movable property can be acquired [only] by the act of drawing¹,² but whoever fulfills his word, the sages are well pleased with him.
– Mishnah Sheviit 10:9³

Ruach chachamim – רוח חכמים

“Ruach chachamim noche mehem” or “ein ruach chachamim noche mehem” literally means, the spirit of the wise is or is not pleased with (or more literally; calm because of) him.

“Ein ruach chachamim noche…” typically refers to improper activity and behavior that is neither forbidden⁴ nor unethical⁵. The conventional understanding of which is;⁶ that the sages are displeased with such a man, however other explanations have been offered,⁷ among them an original explanation of the Malekhet Shlomo. He suggests that it could mean; that the person himself (his internal spirit of wisdom and piety) is not pleased by such behavior.⁸

Ruach chachamim noche mehem

Sheviit:

According to the Law in the Pentateuch, every seventh year must be a Sabbath of rest for the land… The Law further states that in this year, or, more accurately, at the end of it (Sifre, Deut. 111 [ed. Friedmann, p. 97a]), every creditor must release any loan made to his neighbor (Deut. xv. 1-3);⁹

Thus, though one can evade repaying a debt due to the law of sheviit, the Mishnah nonetheless states; “one who repays his debts after the seventh year, the sages are pleased with him (ruach chachamim noche mimenu).”

Similarly, based on the principle of “ger shenitgayer kekatan shenolad dami” (“a convert is like a newborn baby”, so he is no longer related to his original family).¹⁰ “One who borrows from a convert” who dies leaving children who based on this rule, are (Biblically¹¹) not considered related to him and certainly are not legally considered to be his children; “the debt need not be repaid to his sons”. However, “if he returns it, the sages are pleased with him.”¹²

There is a similar case in the Jerusalem Talmud (Sheviit 10:4), regarding someone that borrowed money from a man, whose only heir is his mother:

If somebody died who was the last of his family and he has no heir except his mother one does not have to repay, but if the debtor repaid the Sages are pleased with him.¹³

The same is true regarding one who keeps his word (regarding business agreements):¹⁴

All movable property can be acquired [only] by the act of drawing¹⁵,¹⁶ but whoever fulfills his word, the sages are well pleased with him.¹⁷

Ein ruach chachamim noche mehem

Regarding one who “fulfills his words” it says; “the sages are well pleased with him”, and regarding one who does not, it says; “the Sages are displeased with him.”

The baraita concludes: And one who negotiates, where the negotiation culminates with a statement committing himself to acquire the item, did not acquire the item without a formal act of acquisition. But with regard to one who reneges on his commitment, the Sages are displeased with him.¹⁸

Similarly the Mishnah (Bava Batra 8:5) states:¹⁹

With regard to one who wrote a document granting his property to others as a gift and left his sons with nothing, what he did is done, i.e., it takes effect; but the Sages are displeased with him.²⁰

A reformed²¹ usurer or thief, is obligated to return the interest or compensate the theft, however it is said about someone that accepts that money²² “ein ruach chachamim noche hemenu”:²³

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevi’it 8:11): With regard to robbers or usurers that returned either the stolen item or the interest to the one from whom they took it, one should not accept it from them. And with regard to one who does accept it from them, the Sages are displeased with him, since by doing so he discourages those who wish to repent.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This mishna, i.e., the statement of the Tosefta, was taught in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: There was an incident with regard to one man who desired to repent after having been a thief for many years. His wife said to him: Empty one [reika], if you repent you will have to return all the stolen items to their rightful owners, and even the belt that you are wearing is not yours, and he refrained and did not repent. At that time, the Sages said: With regard to robbers or usurers that returned either the stolen item or the interest to the one from whom they took it, one should not accept it from them. And concerning one who does accept it from them, the Sages are displeased with him.²⁴

It is fairly obvious that individuals have the inherent right to seek compensation for what has been stolen from them. Similarly, one may exercise the right to bestow a gift, even if it entails bypassing a direct inheritance to their offspring, or to retract from a previously agreed-upon deal. Nevertheless, exercising this right can entail significant consequences. Acting solely within the confines of Halacha (even if while doing so adheres to a legitimate moral and ethical standard), may inadvertently generate unjust ripple effects. When an individual chooses to gift their entire estate to a friend prior to his passing, it results in his children being excluded from the inheritance. While the act of gifting falls within the individual’s rights, the sages were mindful of the consequential impact of such decisions. Similarly, when one opts to retract from a deal, despite his entitlement to do so, it can inflict significant harm upon the other party involved. It goes without saying that reclaiming stolen property, while well within one’s rights, may potentially cause tremendous damage.

Likewise, repaying a debt that could technically be circumvented due to a legal loophole is not strictly obligatory, yet it is deemed necessary and yields productive consequences.

To foster a well-functioning society, the establishment of behavioral norms and standards is imperative. The transgressions encapsulated in the principle of “ein ruach chachamim noche…” are not inherently ethical injustices; rather, they reflect societal and cultural deviations. While they may be destructive and damaging, they can not be criminalized . It appears that “ruach chachamim noche” endeavors to address and mitigate such gaps in societal regulation.²⁵

“Ruach chachamim” in the Midrash and Talmud.

Similarly, the phrase can be found in slightly different but comparable contexts:

NIDDAH (Heb. נִדָּה “menstruating woman”; literally, “one who is excluded” or “expelled”). According to Jewish law, a man is forbidden to maintain sexual relations with his wife during and for some time both before and after (see below) her menses. Marital intimacy may resume only after the wife has undergone ritual immersion (see *Mikveh; *Ablution) at the appropriate time.²⁶
– Encyclopaedia Judaica.

What is the fence that the Torah made around its words?…
…Because of this they said: The spirit of the sages is pleased with anyone who makes herself unattractive during the days of her period [of impurity]. The spirit of the sages is displeased with anyone who makes herself attractive during the days of her period [of impurity].²⁷
– Avot DeRabbi Natan (2:1)²⁸

It is self understood that a woman has the autonomy to dress according to her own preferences. Neither her husband and certainly not the rabbis have the authority to tell her to dress “less attractive”²⁹ nor whether she should wear jewelry. However, it’s important to recognize that while individuals have the right to express themselves through their attire, there may be practical considerations to consider. Engaging in behaviors intended to enhance attractiveness during periods of abstention from sexual intercourse may potentially lead to undesirable consequences.

Furthermore, it’s worth noting that the ‘sages’ cannot possibly be aware of how a woman dresses in the privacy of her home to express displeasure. It stands to reason that ‘ruach chachamim noche…’ represents more than just a consideration for the emotional well-being of the sages.³⁰ Rather, it embodies a category and standard of ethical behavior. It signifies behaviors that individuals are entitled to but should refrain from due to potential negative consequences, as well as behaviors that are not obligatory but are undertaken because they yield positive outcomes

There is a nuanced balance between her making herself undesirable to her husband and over decorating herself. Rabbi Joseph Karo in Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh De’ah 195:9) ruled (based on the Talmud) that:

With difficulty, they permitted her to adorn herself during her days of Niddah³¹, so that she will not become unappealing to her husband³².

The Tzemach Tzedek drew an implication from the passage quoted above,³³ that although a woman could (and is seemingly advised to) adorn herself while she is a Niddah, it’s right to minimize doing so as much as possible.

The law acknowledges the importance of a woman adorning herself during her days of Niddah, thereby permitting it, while simultaneously acknowledging that it may not always be the wisest choice. This nuanced and delicate gray area is not precisely defined, yet transgressing it may result in “the spirit of the sages” being “displeased” with her.

Similarly the Talmud (Shabbat 121b) relates:

The tanna who recited tannaitic literature before Rava bar Rav Huna taught a baraita: One who kills snakes and scorpions on Shabbat, the spirit of the pious is not pleased with him. Rava bar Rav Huna said to him: And with regard to those pious, the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with them, as snakes and scorpions harm people. The Gemara comments: And this statement disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, for Rav Huna saw a person killing a hornet on Shabbat and said to him: Have you finished killing all the hornets? This indicates that he was not pleased with him.³⁴

The dispute between the sages and the pious is not necessarily limited to the laws of Shabbat; it’s conceivable that it extended to broader ethical considerations, such as the killing of snakes and scorpions. [For instance, given the prevalence of scorpions, one might argue that it is ethically questionable to kill them.]³⁵ However, it appears that the spirit of the sages was displeased with the pious, as their behavior could lead to negative consequences in the form of potential harm from snakes and scorpions in the future.

As mentioned previously, there appear to be two distinct conditions to evoke the sage’s displeasure: 1) The activity must be permitted; engaging in forbidden and unethical behavior is sinful. The activity that displeases the sages is one in which the individual is fully entitled to engage in. 2) The displeasement arises from the potential negative or damaging consequences of the activity.

Adhering strictly to the law can sometimes lead to behavior that, while not explicitly prohibited, may still be considered improper. A notable example of this concept is what the Ramban referred to as “naval birshut haTorah”:

Naval birshut haTorah

The Ramban³⁶ relates to the exploitation of permitted behavior:

…the matter is that the Torah proscribed certain sexual practices and forbade certain foods, but it permitted relations with one’s wife and the consumption of meat and wine. Now the glutton may therefore find license to be lecherous with his wife or his many wives, inebriated with wine and gorged with meat. He might speak profanity without compunction since the Torah records no such prohibition, and in the process he would be considered a vile and dissolute person that is nevertheless acting within the boundaries of the Torah! Therefore this verse (of “Kedoshim tihiyu”) is mentioned after the Torah has detailed all of the activities that are to be curtailed entirely, for it presents us with a general and comprehensive command that we are to be separated from overindulgence…³⁷

The Jews accepting the Torah proclaimed “na’aseh v’nishmah,” meaning “we will do and we will hearken.”³⁸ Rabbi Shmuel Bornsztain elaborated on the concept of “hearkening,”³⁹ which involves two aspects: 1) hearkening in a superficial sense; understanding the law accurately without alterations, and 2) listening to the “pnimiut hadavar,” the internal essence of the law, to pursue the Torah’s intention, and the “tachlit hadavar,” its purpose and intent, of what the Torah demands. He then refers to the Ramban’s concept of “naval birshut haTorah.” As the renowned Rabbi Paul Simon once aptly said, “People hearing without listening.”

Similarly, someone who, for instance, doesn’t repay a debt because the seventh year has passed, although entitled to do so, is naval birshut haTorah.⁴⁰

Rabbi Yehuda Henkin writes about over-decoration,⁴¹ noting that women who excessively adorn themselves or spend excessively on clothing may be in violation of naval birshut haTorah. Similarly, he recounts experiences of attending events and restaurants claiming to be “mehadrin,” rigorously kosher. While the food was undoubtedly kosher, he observes that the lavish decoration exceeded what he considers to be within the acceptable parameters of decoration, thus naval birshut haTorah. He claims to have submitted this complaint to orthodox publications, only to have it rejected out of concern that it might “offend the reader.”

Similarly, a woman who adorns herself unnecessarily while in a state of nida is surely guilty of naval birshut haTorah.

The evolution of the sages’s spirit

Pleasing and displeasing the spirit of the sages, can have significant ramifications, including those of halachic import.⁴²

In Avot DeRabbi Natan 25, it is stated that if the spirit of the sages is pleased with him, it is considered a positive sign. The text suggests that when the sages hold a favorable view of someone at the time of their death, it indicates a positive outcome. Conversely, if the sages do not view someone kindly, it is seen as a negative sign.

When the sages look kindly upon someone (at the time of his death), that is a good sign. When the sages do not look kindly upon someone, that is a bad sign.⁴³

Similarly the Talmud (Shabbat 153a) states:

Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: Which type of person has a share in the World-to-Come? He said to him: Rabbi Ḥanina said: Anyone with whom our Rabbis are pleased has a share in the World-to-Come.⁴⁴

The phrase has been adopted by later rabbis, in different contexts:⁴⁵

If someone (random⁴⁶) assumes the position of “chazan” (cantor) in the synagogue without obtaining permission from the community, their prayer may be subject to disqualification if even one person protests. In the case of an individual who nonetheless takes on the role of “chazan,” we encounter the term “ein ruach chachamim noche…”.⁴⁷

In addition to its presence in rabbinic literature, the phrase “ein ruach chachamim noche…” is a commonly used term in yeshiva lingo.⁴⁸

“Kana’im pogim bo” (zealots hurt him⁴⁹)

…Pinchas fulfilled the halacha of kana’im pogim bo whereby a kana’i (zealot) is granted permission to kill people performing specific aveiros. If, for example, a kana’i sees a Jewish male living with an idol-worshiping woman in public (in front of 10 Jews), he may kill them. That is why Pinchas was allowed to kill Zimri and Kazbi.⁵⁰

It is stated that his actions were contrary to the will of the sages,⁵¹ which serves as another example of the phenomenon discussed earlier. This appears to be another instance of “ein ruach chachamim noche…”⁵² Additionally, a rabbi should not rule according to this law, known as “halacha ve’en morim kein” in Hebrew.⁵³

Pleasing the spirit of the people

Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa would say (Pirkei Avot 3:10):

He used to say: one with whom men are pleased, God is pleased. But anyone from whom men are displeased, God is displeased.⁵⁴

Yet again the phenomenon of “ruach… noche” but it is not the spirit of the sages at question, rather His spirit and that of the people. The concern regarding the pleasing of people is not uncommon in talmudic texts. For example (Yoma 86a):

Abaye said: As it was taught in a baraita that it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 6:5), which means that you shall make the name of Heaven beloved. How should one do so? One should do so in that he should read Torah, and learn Mishna, and serve Torah scholars, and he should be pleasant with people in his business transactions. What do people say about such a person? Fortunate is his father who taught him Torah, fortunate is his teacher who taught him Torah, woe to the people who have not studied Torah. So-and-so, who taught him Torah, see how pleasant are his ways, how proper are his deeds. The verse states about him and others like him: “You are My servant, Israel, in whom I will be glorified” (Isaiah 49:3).
But one who reads Torah, and learns Mishna, and serves Torah scholars, but his business practices are not done faithfully, and he does not speak pleasantly with other people, what do people say about him? Woe to so-and-so who studied Torah, woe to his father who taught him Torah, woe to his teacher who taught him Torah. So-and-so who studied Torah, see how destructive are his deeds, and how ugly are his ways. About him and others like him the verse states that the gentiles will say: “Men said of them: These are the people of the Lord, yet they had to leave His land” (Ezekiel 36:20). Through their sins and subsequent exile, such people have desecrated the name of God.⁵⁵

The Rashash⁵⁶ interpreted the above-mentioned verse (“These are the people of the Lord, yet they had to leave His land”) as a complaint from non-Jews regarding the lack of adherence to behavioral norms and standards among the Jews. According to this interpretation, in the verse, the non-Jews complain that those who study the Torah (the Jews) have departed from the “way of the land” and from ethical conduct, indicating their engagement in improper behavior and deviation from ethical norms.

Naphtali Hirz Wessely asserted⁵⁷ that even if a Talmud chacham lives his life in accordance with halacha, his Torah learning and religious service become meaningless (einam klum) if he displeases the spirit of the people.

The displeasure of both the people and the sages appear to carry significant weight and alignment.⁵⁸ It is possible for an individual to lead a devoutly religious life while displeasing the “ruach” of either the people or the sages.

In my opinion, it seems fair to say that the displeasure serves to cultivate a cultural disapproval and lack of acceptance or tolerance toward certain behaviors, aimed at shielding and protecting people from potential harm. The displeasure does not aim to generate legal consequences for unjust actions.

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

1
“Drawing” refers to an act of a kinyan (acquisition) achieved by pulling or raising it, see kinjan..
2
With regards to what this means see mi sepora...
3
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Sheviit.10.9?lang=bi.
4
There are countless sources for this; see for instance; Ben Yehoyada on Yoma 38a, and see Ohr HaTzafun, Bereshit, XXXVI, and see Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 127:2, in the name of the Nimmukei Yosef, and Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Sheviit 10:9:2 (and see Teshuvot Rashi 79). However see; Sede Chemed, maarechet aleph 22, ein ruach chachamim, and maarechet lamed 3, lo tehevei (the second paragraph) and Rosh David (Chida), Pinchas, that this may not be so straight forward, it would however seem to me, that not all displeasures of the sages spirit are equally forbidden, some are completely allowed some may have alternative prohibitions, but to some degree the content of this article and this point applies to all of the transgressions of their spirit pleasure.
5
Similarly to the discussed in the previous footnote that there may be different degrees of allowance and prohibitions with regards to, displeasing the sages spirit, the same is true with regards to the code of ethics of “ein ruach chachamim…”, some transgressions may be more unethical than others, but the overall principle is that there is no inherent and objective immorality in the action, rather more of a cultural and societal pressure that guarantees it and deems it wrong. See in the continuation of the article that this will be expounded on.
6
“It should be noted that the term “Ein Ruach Chachamim Nochah Heimenu” is not a mild rebuke. The Rashbam (commenting to Bava Batra 133b s.v. Ein) explains this phrase to mean that Chazal are profoundly disturbed by someone disinheriting their Halachic heirs. The Rashbam’s comments are cited by the Sema (C.M. 282:2), one of the premier commentaries to the Choshen Mishpat section of the Shulchan Aruch.” https://www.koltorah.org/halachah/yerushah-disinheritance-by-rabbi-chaim-jachter
7
See for example; Ran on Kiddushin 7b (Rif’s pages) (dibur hamatchil kan), and Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 127:3 (dibur hamatchil lo). As mentioned in an earlier footnote, not all the cases of “ruach chachamim…” are the same, therefore it is possible that the different explanations would apply to different cases.
8
See for example; Melekhet Shelomoh, Mishnah Sheviit 10:9, and in addition see Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 366:3, and Tosafot Yom Tov on Pirkei Avot 3:10:2.
9
https://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/13519-shebi-it
10
https://www.sefaria.org/Gray_Matter_II%2C_Family_Matters%2C_In_Vitro_Fertilization.14?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
11
A convert is still not allowed to marry his sister rabbinically; “The proselyte is regarded as a new-born child; hence his former family connections are considered as ended, and he might legally marry his own mother or sister; but lest he come to the conclusion that his new status is less holy than his former, such unions are prohibited (see Shulḥan ‘Aruk, Yoreh De’ah, 269; “Yad,” Issure Biah, xiv. 13).” See https://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4635-conversion-to-judaism
12
See Tosafot on Kiddushin 18a (dibur hamatchil; kan), in the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam this would only apply to a debt that came about through borrowing the money, because he was kind enough to lend the money. Some however may argue and apply it also to returning a deposit. Regarding this topic see; Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 127:2.
13
https://www.sefaria.org/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sheviit.10.4.2?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
14
This however is not so straight forward if it is not a sin, see; Mi Seporá?? and see Encyclopedia Talmudit, ein ruach chachamim, footnote 17. And see Peninei Halakhah, Likkutim II 2:9, that this quality guards and protects the virtue of humanity.
15
See footnote 1.
16
See footnote 2.
17
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Sheviit.10.9?lang=bi
18
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Metzia.48a.2?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
19
See Encyclopedia Talmudit, ein ruach chachamim, footnote 17, that this may also contain sinful behavior.
20
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Batra.133b.4?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&p2=Mishnah_Bava_Batra.8.5&lang2=bi
21
See for instance Teshuvot HaRivash 417, and Teshuvot HaRadbaz Volume 1 528. And see the above quoted sources that; if it is a one time theft then he can accept it,and in addition, if he is not reformed one is allowed to accept it. So too if the object is still intact (which will be mentioned in a later footnote).
22
See https://daf-yomi.com/DYItemDetails.aspx?itemId=34510 that he gives an interesting alternative understanding, that the rabbis are displeased with the thief for returning it, according to this interpretation as well, it is for upkeep a societal norm.
23
See Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 1:13) and Me’irat Einayim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 366:3, that refer to not accepting the stolen as a “takanah”. If the original stolen object is still intact and returnable, see Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 366:1 and the commentaries, that one could accept it (same applies to usurers, see for instance; Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 161).
24
https://www.sefaria.org/Bava_Kamma.94b?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
25
However see; LeNevukhei HaTekufah 2:5, that he infures from “ein ruach chachamim noche…” that at times, we priorities the right of the individual even over that of the public, however that does not negate the point being made in this article.
26
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/niddah-0
27
https://www.sefaria.org/Avot_DeRabbi_Natan.2.1?vhe=Talmud_Bavli,_Vilna_1883_ed.&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
28
Similarly see; Bamidbar Rabbah 10.
29
Obviously while complying with the rules and regulations of “tzniut”.
30
Though i do not feel like this point needs proving, here is an example; see Shenei Luchot HaBerit, Torah Shebikhtav, Shemot, Torah Ohr, about how Moshe did not want to displease the spirit of the sages.
31
https://www.sefaria.org/Shulchan_Arukh%2C_Yoreh_De’ah.195.9?vhe=Ashlei_Ravrevei:_Shulchan_Aruch_Yoreh_Deah,_Lemberg,_1888&lang=bi&with=Talmud&lang2=en
32
https://www.sefaria.org/Shabbat.64b.15?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
33
Piskei Dinim, Yoreh De’ah 195:9.
34
https://www.sefaria.org/Shabbat.121b.6?vhe=William_Davidson_Edition_-_Vocalized_Aramaic&lang=bi
35
See for example https://asif.co.il/wpfb-file/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A0%D7%97%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%92%D7%AA/
36
On Leviticus 19.
37
https://parsha.net/vayikra/Kedoshim65.doc
38
https://www.sefaria.org/Exodus.24.7?vhe=Tanach_with_Ta%27amei_Hamikra&ven=The_Five_Books_of_Moses,_by_Everett_Fox._New_York,_Schocken_Books,_1995&lang=bi&aliyot=0
39
Shem MiShmuel, Shavuot 6, in addition see Vaetchanan 4, and Eikev 6.
40
See Peninei Halakhah, Shemitah and Yovel 6:2, In addition, see (Peninei Halakhah), Kashrut 34:13 footnote 16 he uses this term for a different case.
41
Responsa Benei Banim, Volume III 25.
42
See for instance Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 282, about not being a witness for such a cause, and regarding naval birshut hatora there are also halachic “nafka minot”, see for instance Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IV, General Topics 3, and see Teshuvot HaRivash 432, regarding gambling, in the opinion of R’ Sheshet.
43
https://www.sefaria.org/Avot_DeRabbi_Natan.25.1?vhe=Talmud_Bavli,_Vilna_1883_ed.&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
44
https://www.sefaria.org/Avot_DeRabbi_Natan.25.1?vhe=Talmud_Bavli,_Vilna_1883_ed.&lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
45
See for example; Teshuvot Rashi 276 (and see Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim 143:4, and see Teshuva 79), and Noda BiYhudah I, Even HaEzer 47, and Chakham Tzvi 8, and Responsa Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer 2:125 (and Orach Chayim 100), and Melamed Leho’il Part II 47. See also Sefer HaTashbetz, Part III 3, and see Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim 584:2 (and see 505, and see Yoreh Deah 243:2). And see; Gevurot Hashem 44, and Derekh Chayim 5:6:11, and Pele Yoetz 18. And see Teshuvot HaRivash 127.
Very often regarding being stringent without need or proof this term is used, see for instance; Teshuvot Rashi 101, and Responsa Maharashdam, Even HaEzer 80, and in Responsa 52 (and in 165) in the name of the Rambam. In addition see Teshuvot Bayit Chadash, HaYeshanot 110, and see Teshuvot HaRivash 213. And see Sefer HaTashbetz, Part III 240, to the contrary.
46
See Teshuvot Maharil 97.
47
See Teshuvot Maharil 97, and Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim 53:11.
48
See for example; https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/the-az-thread-discuss-the-shidduch-age-gap/page/8 and https://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol31/v31n151.shtml
49
https://etzion.org.il/en/talmud/studies-gemara/midrash-and-aggada/shimshon-halakha-and-morality
50
https://www.jewishpress.com/judaism/parsha/kanaim-pogim-bo/2016/07/28/
51
Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 9:7, as a matter of fact, they were going to excommunicate him (if not for His interference). In addition see Mishnat Eretz Yisrael on Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:6.
52
See for instance Ohr LaYesharim on Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:7, and see Rosh David (Chida), Pinchas, and Torah Temimah on Torah, Numbers 25:13.
53
See Sanhedrin 82a, however it should be noted that the term used in the Talmud is “haba limalech en morin lo”.
54
https://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.3.10?lang=bi
55
https://www.sefaria.org/Yoma.86a?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
56
Yoma 86a.
57
Yein Levanon on Avot 3:10.
58
See Tosafot Yom Tov on Pirkei Avot 3:10, and Gilyon HaShas on Bava Kamma 94b, but seemingly the comparison is only a linguistic one. Similarly see Chidushei Agadot on Bava Kamma 94b.

Olvass!

1. Talmudi Fogalmak

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Ruach Chachamim

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Olvass!

Táromet

Mákin Veonsin Selo Min Hádin

Gólem Gyilkolás

Diné Sámájim

Mi Seporá Midor Hámábul

Kinjánim