בס”ד

Bain k’echad – באין כאחד

Definition:
Two things that cause each other. Alternatively, when the cause comes together, simultaneously with the effect (and doesn’t precede it).

A hypothetical example could be: A scenario whereby one bestows upon himself Rabbinic Ordination. Being that the ordination would result in him being a rabbi, would we say, he was ordained by one?

This is a hard concept to understand. Allegedly¹ Rabbi Israel Joshua Trunk raised his hands towards heaven on his deathbed and said; “I understood the entire Torah with the exception of three things”. Our topic is one of them.

The term “bain k’echad” is often used outside talmudic context.²

In the Talmud

The Mishna (Kiddushin 1:3) quotes Rabbi Meir:

A Canaanite slave is acquired by means of money, by means of a document, or by means of the master taking possession of him. And he can acquire himself, i.e., his freedom, by means of money given by others, i.e., other people can give money to his master, and by means of a bill of manumission if he accepts it by himself. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.³

The Talmud is bothered with a seemingly obvious question; how can a slave acquire the bill when whatever he acquires he does so for the master, resulting in the master indirectly giving himself the bill? The Talmud settles this problem, by coining the paradoxical maxim: “gito veyado bain k’echad”⁴ ie “his hand and his bill come simultaneously”.

Rav Ashi said to him: It was difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect emancipation by placing a bill of manumission in the hand of a slave, as follows: According to the one who says that a slave can be emancipated with a bill of manumission by receiving the bill himself, one can ask: How is this effective? Isn’t the hand of a slave like the hand of his master, as the master owns the slave’s body? Therefore, when the master gives the bill of manumission to his slave, it is as though he gave it to himself, and the bill is never considered as having reached the slave’s domain. How can the slave be emancipated in this manner? Rather, one must say that his bill of manumission and his hand enter his possession simultaneously. So too, with regard to a woman’s courtyard, one can explain that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.⁵

In the state of slavery, one can not acquire an object for oneself, thus his ability to gain possession of the bill is ironically a direct consequence of doing so.

Similarly (Sanhedrin 16b):

With regard to all of the utensils that Moses fashioned, their anointment with the sacred oil is what consecrates them, rendering them fit for service in the Tabernacle. From that point forward, i.e., in future generations, there is no need for anointment, but rather their service in and of itself dedicates them, meaning that when they are used for the first time in sacred service they become consecrated.⁶

Here again we encounter the same “bain k’echad” paradox; the utensils became sacred from the very thing it is making sacred.⁷

Similarly, only a “Kohen Gadol” (high priest) may perform the Yom Kippur services (in the temple), however performing the service would render a regular Kohen a Kohen Gadol, consequently allowing him to perform it:

By performing part of the service while wearing the garments of the High Priest, he is initiated as acting High Priest. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: A non-priest who turns over part of the offering on the altar with a fork is liable to receive the death penalty because he engaged in Temple service restricted to priests. And Rav Pappa said: That action is unnecessary and therefore superfluous; his service initiates him. The replacement High Priest need not undergo any preliminary initiation. His very performance of the Yom Kippur service, which is valid only if performed by the High Priest, initiates him as acting High Priest.⁸

We apply the rule when the consequence is spiritual and towards God.

We would usually find the idea of bain k’echad, with regards to the service in the temple.

Chadash:

Hebrew for “New.” This refers to an early agricultural-Halachic state of the five types of grain (“chitim” – wheat; “seorim” – barley, “kusmin” – spelt, “shibbolet shual – oats, “shifon” – rye) which is obtained when they have taken root before the sixteenth of Nisan. Thus, before the sixteenth, these grains are considered “chadash,” in which they are prohibited; after the sixteenth, they enter the stage of “yashan,” old, in which they are permitted. In the time of the Temple, it was the actual Omer Offering (see below) which effected the change in status;⁹

The omer offering “consisted of one omer¹⁰ of freshly harvested grain, and was waved in the Temple.”¹¹

The Temple only offered sacrifices of which the ingredients were kosher. The Bible (Ezekiel

45:15) says “mimashke yisrael” which means; the food brought before God needs to be edible for Jews. Leaving us with an obvious question, “how could the omer be offered, if the produce was “chadash”? The Rashba (Menachot 5a) suggests an explanation based on the rule of bain k’echad; being that the grain becomes kosher as result of the omer sacrifice, the sacrifice is offered from kosher ingredients.

The food is kosher because of the sacrifice, and the sacrifice is valid because the food is kosher.

God is above time

This would seemingly contradict the basic philosophical principle, that the cause always precedes the effect.¹² How can it be possible for two things to cause each other?

Rabbi Yosef Engel explained¹³ that bain k’echad only applies if it relates to spiritual laws whereby the consequence is significant to God alone. Being that He is above time, it is not required that the cause precedes the effect.

If the priests serving in the Temple would take a Todah offering (sacrifice for thanksgiving) somewhere, the place would become sacred. Generally if the sacrifice is in an unholy place, it becomes disqualified. However, were another one to be placed there, it would not be disqualified, since the first Todah made the place holy. However the first Todah is no longer fit for consumption as a result of being in an unholy place, only the second one may be eaten.¹⁴

In order for the first one to sanctify the location, it is a prerequisite that it in itself is sacred too. If it was present in an unsacred place and lost its holiness it can no longer sanctify the location. This would leave a paradox; the first Todah was in an unholy place which caused it to lose its sanctity, how then can it sanctify the location?

To answer this question the Rashba (Shevuot 15b) mentions the rule of bain k’echad. Being that the Todah makes the place sacred, the Todah consequently is in a sacred place and does not lose its holiness.

If that is the case, we still need to understand why the first Todah could not be eaten. If bain k’echad allows it to be holy in order to effectuate sanctity, surely it should not be disqualified from being eaten? Rabbi Yosef Engel solves this difficulty thus; the location becoming sanctified is a spiritual matter, hence we can apply bain k’echad, but it being eaten is not, henceforth we would not utilize the rule of bain k’echad, thereby the eating would be forbidden.

A different bain k’echad

This is not the same as the classic bain k’echad. The location’s state of sanctity is not the cause of the sacrifice’s holiness, it is holy from before it was located there. Rather, the element of bain k’echad is in that the cause and the effect come together. The sacrifice is considered to be located in a sacred place, and therefore does not lose its holiness. But the sacrifice itself is what makes the place sacred. However the place is not what makes the sacrifice sacred.

Nonetheless, we still see the dichotomy between spiritual laws and those in which the consequence is for humans.

Conversion is spiritual matter

Similarly a slave that gets freed, after he is free, is given full Jewish status, making his freedom a spiritual matter, which is why we apply the logic of bain k’echad in freeing a slave.¹⁵

This can be compared to a question posed by the Minchat Chinukh (2:3):

In the conversion process, the convertee needs to get a circumcision, and then immerse himself in the mikvah. The Rema writes; If however “he immerses before he is circumcised, it is effective… and there are those who say that…”.¹⁶ The Ramban believed that if someone immersed in the mikvah, the conversion can be completed by the circumcision.

Can he circumcise himself to complete his conversion, or alternatively were he to do so, would the conversion be considered kosher (if it requires a jewish “mohel”¹⁷)?

The Minchat Chinukh raises the possibility that being that the circumcision would make him Jewish, it is indeed a Jew that circumcised him.

This would be the classic bain k’echad; he can only perform the circumcision because he is Jewish, but he is only jewish because of the circumcision.

Similarly in the conversion of a minor, the beth din (rabbinic court) acts on behalf of the minor. Though he can not legally consent, they have the right to act on his behalf conditioned on the premise of him being Jewish. Being that the conversion makes the minor a Jew, consequently they are acting on behalf of a Jew. Yet again we see the workings of bain k’echad; he is Jewish because of the conversion, yet the court only has the right to complete the conversion because he is jewish.¹⁸

In the laws of shabbat, a similar idea can be found. One is not allowed to move something from a private domain to a public one (on shabbat). If someone transforms the location’s status (from a private domain to a public domain) with the act of moving the object, did he violate the shabbat?

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: In a case where there is a pit that is nine handbreadths deep, and one dug out a segment of earth from the bottom of the pit and thereby completed the depth of the pit to ten handbreadths, and then he proceeded to throw the earth into the public domain, what is the ruling? The two sides to the dilemma are: Is it that the lifting of the object and establishment of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps he is not liable. And if you say: Since the partition was not ten handbreadths deep initially, he is not liable, then in a case where there is a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and one placed a segment of earth into the pit and thereby minimized its depth to less than ten handbreadths, nullifying its status as a private domain, what is the ruling? The two sides of the question are: Is it that placement of the object and the elimination of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps, he is not liable because the partition was not intact throughout the performance of the action.¹⁹

If someone steals something, he is obligated to return the object itself, therefore it does not really belong to him. However if the object significantly changes, he acquires the object, and no longer needs to return the actual object (rather the value). If someone donates the stolen object to the temple, that in itself constitutes a significant change, the donation is valid, thus he no longer needs to return the object. The problem; one can only donate to (the temple) his own belongings, so how can this donation be valid? The Rashba (Gittin 55b) answers; bain k’echad, being that the sanctification is a significant change, it makes it his belonging, and since it is his, he can donate it.

It is only his because he donated it, but he can only donate it if it’s his.

Non spiritual bain k’echad

In order for an acquisition to be valid, two conditions need to be met: There needs to be a mutual understanding between all parties of the transaction, and the function of the acquisition needs to be met. For example, if someone buys a can of beer, it is required that there is a mutual understanding that the money is given in exchange for the beer. It is also a prerequisite that the ownership of the beer does indeed transfer it to the buyer. If these two fundamental conditions are not met, there is no sale.

When a man gives a woman money with the intent of marriage ie kinyan kidushin, it is only a valid transference of ownership if there is a) a mutual understanding, and b) if the woman indeed becomes married from the money. If the money does not result in a marriage he never gave it to her. In order for the marriage to be valid, it is required that the woman acquires the money, it is not sufficient to simply receive it. In this way it differs from the rules of divorce. For a divorce to be valid, it is sufficient for the man to give a gett (bill of divorce) to his wife, however by a marriage it is required that she acquires it as well. This creates an abstract bain k’echad; in order for her to acquire the money, the transaction needs to result in them being married, but in order for it to create the marriage she needs to acquire the money.²⁰

Rabbi Yosef Engel brought alternative cases of bain k’echad:²¹

Yibbum (levirate marriage)

The verse states:

When brothers dwell together and one of them dies and leaves no offspring, the wife of the deceased shall not become that of another party, outside the family. Her husband’s brother shall unite with her: he shall take her as his wife and perform the levir’s duty.²²

It is forbidden for a man to be with his brother’s wife (this applies even if the brother dies). This leaves us with a paradox; the only reason they can engage in a sexual activity is because of yibbum, but the Yibbum only happens through that activity. The forbidden activity permits itself!

An interesting example has been suggested. If a man divorces his wife on the condition that she has sexual intercourse with a particular man. Being that this sexual act fulfills the condition of the divorce, and the effect of this act would retroactively validate the divorce, her act would not be a breach of her marital responsibility.²³

In the laws of divorce

The Talmud in Gittin 77a states:

It was taught in the mishna that if the husband threw the bill of divorce into his wife’s courtyard, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: How can she own a courtyard of her own? There is a principle: That which a woman acquired is acquired by her husband, which indicates that the husband has the rights to all profits generated by his wife’s property. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the courtyard belongs to him for the duration of their marriage….
…Rav Ashi said to him: It was difficult for Rava to understand the halakha that one can effect emancipation by placing a bill of manumission in the hand of a slave, as follows: According to the one who says that a slave can be emancipated with a bill of manumission by receiving the bill himself, one can ask: How is this effective? Isn’t the hand of a slave like the hand of his master, as the master owns the slave’s body? Therefore, when the master gives the bill of manumission to his slave, it is as though he gave it to himself, and the bill is never considered as having reached the slave’s domain. How can the slave be emancipated in this manner? Rather, one must say that his bill of manumission and his hand enter his possession simultaneously. So too, with regard to a woman’s courtyard, one can explain that her bill of divorce and her courtyard enter her possession simultaneously.²⁴

The rabbis established, with regards to the property of a woman who gets married, that the husband be granted temporary rights to the property’s ownership. If the field acquires something, it would enter the possession of the husband. But if the field is acquiring a bill of divorce; being that it gives the property back to the woman, she acquires it. This is a classic example of bain k’echad; she is divorced because she received the gett, but she can only receive it if she is divorced.

When does bain k’echad take effect

The big question has yet to be solved:

This is not a spiritual law, thus the above mentioned explanation (that God is above time, and therefore the cause does not need to precede the effect) would not suffice. It would also potentially enable the expansion of bain k’echad to non spiritual cases. Can we apply it to any case?

How about a present? -The Ketzot Hachoshen²⁵ asked. If someone gives his friend a field as a gift, and places the bill of the transaction in that very field; could the argument be made that since the present makes the field his, consequently it was placed in his field, enabling him to acquire the gift through the field?

There are many answers to this question, all concluding with the position that it is not a valid transaction.

The Ketzot himself believed the reason to differentiate (between the woman getting divorced and the man receiving a present), is in the requirement of the receiving. In order for a divorce to be finalized, the woman needs to receive the bill, however (as mentioned above) she does not need to acquire it. A financial transaction (like a gift) on the other hand, is not complete until the receiver acquired the item upon question. Thus, with regard to receiving a bill of divorce we can apply the rule of bain k’echad, but to acquire something we can not.²⁶

I would like to conclude with an interesting perspective on the concept of bain k’echad offered by the Avnei Nezer²⁷ which could solve the philosophical conundrum mentioned above.

The above discussed cases (of a wife acquiring the bill of divorce with her field, and a slave acquiring the bill of manumission) are unique. The property essentially belongs to the woman, but the rabbis gave her husband temporary rights to the field (for as long as they are married). Similarly, theoretically speaking, a slave can acquire the bill of manumission, which is why a slave owner can free his slave by giving the bill to another man’s slave (to acquire it on behalf of his slave).²⁸ With regards to acquiring things for himself, there are restrictions. These restrictions prevent his acquisition by directing/attributing the (acquisitions) consequences/results to his master.

These restrictions apply as long as the thing it is acquiring does not contradict it. Hence, when the slave is acquiring a bill that would set him free, that bill would in effect be contradicting the owners rights to him and as stated, this would negate that particular restriction. Henceforth the restriction would not apply and the slave would consequently acquire it for himself, The restriction would not prevent this acquisition from being attributed to him. Similarly if the (woman’s) field acquires a bill, that would result in the acquisition being attributed to the woman, the husband’s temporary right would not prevent that from happening.

Torah against nature

In my opinion, it is possible for legal rights to contradict those which are inherent to nature.

The ownership that one has over one’s self,²⁹ is an inherent and fundamental one. If differs from the ownership of an acquired possession. Ownership of objects is usually attained by receiving it from someone else or by making a kinyan (act of acquisition) on it, or by creating it. Ownership is contingent upon external considerations, such as usability (the ability to sell, to give away, to use). The ownership someone has over oneself on the other hand, is not a consequence of a kinyan, as Rabbi Yosef Engel famously said;³⁰ even a dead man owns himself for his owner is himself.

The life of a slave is one of an inherent internal contradiction. Every time a slave creates something, the rules of nature would dictate it be his. When someone creates something it becomes his, when he finds something it should be his, when he brings a child into the world, that child should fundamentally be his. These are the natural consequences that should result from his actions, but the laws of slavery contradict these. As a slave the created/found object belongs to his master, the child he created, is the possession of his owner.

Every acquisition a slave makes has two forces pulling it in opposite directions;³¹ the force of his right to it as an independent person with full autonomy, and the force of the institution of slavery rendering it the masters. The force benefiting the master overrides the force benefiting the slave. However, if the thing being acquired itself argues that the owner does not acquire it (rather the slave does), the master’s unnatural claim can not override the claim of the slave. It is as though the acquired item has settled the dispute.

In the slaveless world we live in, we can still see some semblance of this internal conflict in mundane things. It occurs when an artist has his work or even stage-name stripped and handed over to someone else by the “executives” (record label, production company…). Similarly when people work in a company creating things with creative thought, some might argue that the rightful owner of the product is the one that created it, however in practice the “fruit” of the labor belong to the corporation.

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

1
http://212.199.162.70/viewtopic.php?t=4398&start=40
2
For example; https://www.kikar.co.il/political-news/430972 in the comments, about the supreme court of israel vetoing a rule about their ability to do so. And see; https://www.inn.co.il/news/491652 and; https://www.bhol.co.il/Forums/topic.asp?topic_id=3008165
3
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Kiddushin.1.3?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=en&with=all&lang2=en
4
See for example, Gittin 77b. See also Temurah 25b.
5
https://www.sefaria.org/Gittin.77b.5?ven=William_Davidson_Edition_-_English&lang=en&with=all&lang2=en
6
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.16b.5?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
7
The food put in the utensils became sacred due to the utensils. See for example Mishnah Zevachim 9:7.
8
https://www.sefaria.org/Yoma.12a.11?lang=en&with=all&lang2=en
9
https://www.ou.org/judaism-101/glossary/chadash/
10
The omer is an ancient Israelite unit of dry measure used in the era of the Temple in Jerusalem and also known as an isaron. It is used in the Bible as an ancient unit of volume for grains and dry commodities. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omer_(unit)#:~:text=The%20omer%20
11
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omer_offering
12
The Rambam in Treatise on Logic 12, brings five forms of precedences, it doesn’t necessarily need to precede in time, but has to precede it.
13
Beit Haotzar, maarechet beit, klal 9.
14
See Shevuot 15b.
15
See; Beit Haotzar, maarechet beit, klal 9.
16
https://www.sefaria.org/Shulchan_Arukh%2C_Yoreh_De’ah.268.1?lang=bi&vside=Sefaria_Community_Translation|en&with=Translation%20Open&lang2=en
17
See for example, Rema in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 264:1.
18
See Encyclopedia Talmudit erekh Baim K’echad, see also Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b dibur hamatchil Katan.
19
https://www.sefaria.org/Shabbat.99b.8?lang=bi
20
See Mefaneach Tzfunot p. 191, and see Beit Haotzar, maarechet beit, klal 9.
21
Beit Haotzar, maarechet beit, klal 9.
22
https://www.sefaria.org/Deuteronomy.25.5-6?lang=bi&aliyot=0
23
Also by Rabbi Yosef Engel.
Alternatively; a female slave can set herself free, by engaging in a sexual activity with her master. Since she gave him “pleasure of monetary value”, it’s like she bought her freedom with money. The troubling element to such an argument is that she does not own this pleasure to give, it belongs to the master. So she has not given him anything (that could set her free). However, applying the logic of bain k’echad might help; this act would set her free, resulting in her owning it, thus she can give it. The same paradox as in all the above; it is only hers because she was set free, but she can only be set free if it is hers.
24
https://www.sefaria.org/Gittin.77a.15?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en
25
Ketzot HaChoshen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 200:5.
26
See Teshuvot Ukhtavim, Or Gadol 53, he suggests, perhaps it only applies to a divorce and to the freeing of a slave, for although it is irrational the Torah established it. But we can not extrapolate and apply it to another case.
27
Shut Orach Chaim 22:9. This has been adopted by others too, see for instance; See Hamidot Lcheker HaHalacha vol. 1, in the beginning (mida 1). Rabbi Yosef Engel also briefly mentioned this point. It is important to note, that this is my interpretation of what they wrote, there may be a different explanation.
28
See for example Gittin 23b (Rabbi Yochanan).
29
See Haarot Ubiurim Morristown, gimmel tamuz 5783 (gilyon 937), Kuntres Yad Haeved, from page 90, and see the footnotes. See also Chidushei Rabbi Shmuel, Nedarim 13:7 (it’s also bought there).
30
Beit Haotzar, maarechet alef, klal 138.
31
See in the name of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, in Shiurei Harav Yosef Dov Halevi, Gittin 21b, that the master only owns the slave in a manner of “gavra” which translates as “person” referring to a superficial ownership over the consequences the slave brings about, but not the slave himself, not his body “cheftza”. See also in the footnotes of the above mentioned “Kuntress Yad Haeved”, about the dichotomy of the slave owning himself or at least some part of himself while being a slave.

Olvass!

1. Talmudi Fogalmak

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Bain K’echad

Talmudi Fogalmak Magyarul

Olvass!

Táromet

Mákin Veonsin Selo Min Hádin

Gólem Gyilkolás

Diné Sámájim

Mi Seporá Midor Hámábul

Kinjánim